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THE STORIES OF MARRIAGE
Katharine K. Baker∗
INTRODUCTION
The gay and lesbian community’s response to California’s Proposition 8 was
strong and quick.1 Within days of the 2008 election, opponents of the measure had
targeted its proponents, in particular the Mormon Church, as subjects for scorn.2
Singling out the Mormon Church on this issue was particularly ironic because to
the extent that members of the Mormon Church were responsible for the success of
Proposition 8, they simply did to the gay community what courts of the United
States consistently did to their forebears: defined away their right to marry.3 In
striking down individuals’ rights to enter into polygamous marriages, courts said
that polygamy was not marriage and that monogamy was marriage, but they
expended little energy explaining why.4 This article does not condone either the
forceful effort to pass Proposition 8 or the counter-response from the gay
community,5 but it will argue that part of the problem that same-sex marriage
∗

© 2010 Katharine K. Baker, Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law. This
paper has benefited from conversations with many people, but I would like to extend
special thanks to Felice Batlan, Mary Anne Case, Steve Heyman, Bob Pollack, participants
in the Work, Family and Public Policy Workshop at Washington University, the Ian Ayers’
Co-Author Birthday Bash Workshop at Yale Law School and the Chicago-Kent/University
of Illinois Law Faculty Symposium.
1
Proposition 8, which the California electorate approved with a 52.3% margin on
November 4, 2008, defined marriage as between a man and a woman, thus attempting to
overturn the ruling of the California Supreme Court which granted gays and lesbians the
right to marry. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 452-53 (Cal. 2008); Secretary of
State Debra Bowen, California General Election, Proposition 8 – Eliminates the Right of
Same-Sex Couples to Marry, 52.3% to 47.7%, Nov. 4, 2008, http://vote.sos.ca.gov/.
2
Nicholas Riccardi, Mormon Church Feels the Heat Over Proposition 8, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 17, 2008, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2008/nov/17/nation/na-mormons17.
3
See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 165 (1878) (polygamy is an “offence
[sic] against society”); Potter v. Murray City, 760 F.2d 1065, 1070 (10th Cir. 1985)
(“Monogamy is inextricably woven into the fabric of our society. It is the bedrock upon
which our culture is built.”). It should be noted that members of the Mormon Church no
longer practice polygamy, and the Church has condemned its practice since 1890.
4
See Reynolds, 98 U.S. 145. In Reynolds, the Court did suggest that polygamy “leads
to patriarchal principle, and which, when applied to large communities, fetters the people in
stationary despotism, while that principle cannot long exist in connection with
monogamy.” Id. at 166. The Court didn’t expand on this theory and many might question
whether it is really the number of spouses in a society’s understanding of marriage that
marks the difference between despotism and other forms of government.
5
To the extent that the gay and lesbian community has argued that the Proposition 8
campaign was really nothing other than homophobia and hate, there is also a parallel to the
campaign against polygamy. As Professor Sarah Gordon has explored, anti-Mormonism
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(“SSM”) advocates encounter stems from the failure of courts to explain what
marriage is. It is very hard to talk about a right to marry without a common
understanding of why states license marriage.
In the end, this article will offer a definition of marriage which suggests that
marriage can be beneficial to the state, beneficial to the couple, and integrated into
the rich social history of marriage without necessarily being gendered. In order to
understand why this proffered story is important, the article first evaluates the
marriage narratives that have been told to date in the SSM debate and shows how
those stories have fared as constitutional claims.
During the course of the last fifteen years, proponents of SSM have proffered
several different constitutional arguments in favor of their cause. Most of these
arguments have been rooted in either fundamental rights or equality theory. Both
of these theories have prevailed in some places. The Supreme Court of Hawaii
originally ruled that restricting marriage to opposite-sex couples was gender
discrimination, in violation of the State’s Equal Rights Amendment.6 The Supreme
Courts of Vermont and New Jersey found that gays and lesbians had a right,
grounded in equality doctrine, to the same legal treatment as married people,
though they did not have a right to have their relationship termed “marriage.”7
New Jersey explicitly found that gays and lesbians did not have a fundamental
right to marry.8 The Vermont court did not address that question.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts found that the fundamental
rights and equality arguments were inextricably intertwined and that gays and
lesbians were entitled to get married, but not because they had a fundamental or
equal right to do so.9 Instead, the Massachusetts court found that there was no
rational basis for restricting marriage to opposite-sex couples.10 Recently, the
California, Connecticut and Iowa Supreme Courts have found that gays and
lesbians have an equality right to marry because restricting marriage to oppositesex couples discriminates on the basis of sexual orientation.11 California also found
preceded the anti-polygamist movement. Polygamy became the target, but the original fear
was of moral diversity and difference. See Sarah Barringer Gordon, “Our National
Hearthstone”: Anti-Polygamy Fiction and the Sentimental Campaign Against Moral
Diversity in Antebellum America, 8 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 295, 297 (1996).
6
Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 67 (Haw. 1993).
7
See Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864, 886 (Vt. 1999); Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d
196, 220-21 (N.J. 2006).
8
Lewis, 908 A.2d at 211.
9
Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003).
10
Id. at 961.
11
See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 440-41 (Cal. 2008); Kerrigan v. Comm’r,
957 A.2d 407, 262-63 (Conn. 2008); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 906 (Iowa 2009).
The holding in the California case was overturned by Proposition 8, see In re Marriage
Cases, 183 P.3d at 452-53, and the California Supreme Court accepted Proposition 8’s
ability to restrict marriage to opposite-sex couples in Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 122,
93 Cal. Rptr. 3d 591 (Cal. 2009). After Strauss, gay men and lesbians in California have
neither equality nor a fundamental right to marry, though they do have both an equality and
a fundamental right to “public recognition [of their] relationship as a family.” Id. at 70-71.
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that gays and lesbians had a fundamental right to marry each other.12 Connecticut
and Iowa did not reach that argument.
There has been a good deal of ink spilled over how best to conceptualize the
legal claim to SSM. Because most unenumerated fundamental rights arguments are
controversial, courts and commentators often prefer equality arguments. Moreover,
to some, the fundamental rights argument seems tautological because it assumes a
contested definition of marriage.13 Presumably, before one says that there is a
fundamental right to marriage, one has to define what marriage is. Pro-SSM
advocates would define marriage in a way that can include same-sex couples. AntiSSM marriage advocates would define marriage as between a man and a woman.
Thus, saying that there is a fundamental right to marriage does not say anything
unless there is a common definition of marriage. Equality arguments, it was
thought, avoided that tautological conundrum. But, equality doctrine cannot always
do all the work that proponents of SSM claim. At least equality doctrine cannot do
this work on its own; it needs a story of marriage to go with it. Ultimately, every
argument requires a story about why marriage is important, with a definition of
what marriage is.
This article will explore six different stories of marriage. These are not the
only stories told about marriage, nor are they mutually exclusive. Indeed, one can
believe many of these stories simultaneously. But, different narratives tend to
emerge as dominant in different arguments. Part II examines the stories of
marriage told by advocates of SSM and explains how those stories fare under both
fundamental rights and equal protection analyses. Part III explains the stories told
by critics of SSM. These stories suggest that contrary to what the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court found in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health,
restricting marriage to opposite-sex couples almost certainly passes rational basis
review; and, despite the racial analogies used by the courts in California,
Connecticut and Iowa, racial equality doctrine may not be the most appropriate
precedent.
The critical problem with the equality argument for SSM is that marriage, as
it currently operates in our culture, is deeply gendered. It is gendered not only in
the sense that, in most states, opposite-sex couples have the exclusive right to enter
into marriage, it is gendered because of the way in which marriage facilitates,
produces, and legitimates gender roles. If the predominant story of marriage is one
of an institution that exists to foster differentiated gender role development, then
the equality theory rings hollow because same-sex couples and opposite-sex
couples are not similarly situated in their ability to reify gender roles in marriage.

12

In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 448.
See Andrew Koppelman, Grading the California Same-Sex Marriage Opinion,
BALKINIZATION (2008), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2008/05/grading-california-same-sexmarriage.html (“It won’t do to just define marriage as ‘the substantive right of two adults
who share a loving relationship to join together to establish an officially recognized family
of their own.’ That’s just a bald conclusion masquerading as an argument.”).
13
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Many people will scoff at this understanding of marriage as a purposefully
gendered institution. How can that be a legitimate definition in an era of gender
equality? Perhaps it is not a legitimate definition of marriage, but it is an accurate
description of contemporary marriage. Empirical data verifies what critics of SSM
celebrate: marriage is a “gender factory.”14 Part IV explores the social science data
showing how marriage makes gender.
At a doctrinal level, the fact that marriage is a gender factory may be
constitutionally irrelevant. After all, those who believe that marriage is and should
be gendered appear to believe in “the very stereotype the law condemns.”15 What
makes the gendered story relevant to legal discussions of SSM is its accurate
reflection of the current state of heterosexual marriage and its ability to explain
why and how marriage may be so important to people. As the end of Part IV
suggests, for many people, the ability to live into the stereotypes the law (at times)
condemns is enormously important to their personal identity. The fulfillment of
those socially prescribed gender roles could be so important to a person’s personal
and intimate life that the right to enter an institution that reifies those roles triggers
constitutional protection. In other words, the gendered story of marriage reveals an
inherent tension between that which may make marriage a fundamental right and
the gender equality doctrine that may mandate SSM.
A further problem with the equality argument for SSM is that an examination
of the law of gender equality, like an examination of the way marriage actually
functions in people’s lives, reveals ambivalence about the legitimacy of gender
roles.16 Part V shows how confused the law of sex equality is. Despite the
constitutional doctrine suggesting that gender roles, particularly gender roles in the
household, are constitutionally suspect,17 other areas of the law seem to
14

This term was coined by Sarah Fenstermaker Berk in SARAH FENSTERMAKER
BERK, THE GENDER FACTORY: THE APPORTIONMENT OF WORK IN AMERICAN HOUSEHOLDS
3-10 (Plenum Press 1985).
15
The phrase originally comes from Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991), but is
also cited in J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 138 (1994) and used by Mary Anne Case to
elaborate on how and when the constitution condemns gender stereotypes, see Mary Anne
Case, “The Very Stereotype the Law Condemns”: Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law
as a Quest for Perfect Proxies, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1447, 1452 (2000).
16
Not one court since Baehr has adopted the theory of sex discrimination,
notwithstanding the extensive academic literature exploring how restrictions on SSM are
sex discrimination. See Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender,
1988 WIS. L. REV. 187, 230-34 (1988); Andrew Koppelman, Note, The Miscegenation
Analogy: Sodomy Law as Sex Discrimination, 98 YALE L.J. 145, 154, 160 (1988);
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 153-72 (The Free Press
1996); ANDREW KOPPELMAN, THE GAY RIGHTS QUESTION IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN
LAW, 53-55 (The Univ. of Chi. Press 2002). For a more complete list of scholars who have
argued that sexual orientation discrimination is sex discrimination, see KOPPELMAN, 98
Yale L.J. at 169, nn.4-6.
17
See generally Case, supra note 15, at 1464 (suggesting that the Supreme Court
strikes down any sex differentiation that relies on a gender stereotype unless the stereotype
is a perfect proxy for sex difference); Wendy W. Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some
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accommodate gender roles. Indeed, in both the employment and the marital
context, the more pronounced the gender roles and traits, the more the law feels
compelled to accommodate them. And, even in the constitutional context,
sometimes the law accommodates gender and sex differences.
If enough people believe in or somehow know the gendered story of marriage
to be true, equality arguments for SSM, whether rooted in gender or racial
analogies, prove difficult. The gender equality doctrine may be willing to
accommodate the gendered roles that gendered marriage celebrates, and the racial
discrimination analogy may seem inapt in the face of an institution that gets its
social and personal import from its ability to reify gender. That is why it is
important for proponents of SSM to tell a non-gendered story of marriage. But, it
has to be a story of marriage that explains how marriage can retain the symbolic
and constitutive potential that gender roles have traditionally provided for it
without gender being a part of the story. To paraphrase Gertrude Stein, SSM
advocates must tell a story of marriage that suggests there is a “there there” after
one takes the gender out of marriage.18
Part VI of this essay will offer one such story. It is an understanding of
marriage as an institution in which dependencies develop, roles are assumed and,
for a variety of reasons stemming from the emotional and sexual connections
involved, the general rules of property and contract do not work well. A narrative
like this degenders marriage, but it also celebrates the lack of autonomy,
substantial interdependence and role assumption that mark many marriages. It is
not a narrative that extols the values—individual expression, freedom from social
constraint, personal liberty—that the Constitution is often prized for protecting.
When forced to confront this alternative marriage narrative, many people may not
feel like celebrating. In that case, we need to ask why we have state-sponsored
marriage at all. If we are to have state-sponsored marriage that includes same-sex
couples, we need a story of marriage that explains what marriage is after the
gender is gone.
I. ONE SET OF STORIES
To date, there have been three main stories told by SSM advocates about what
marriage is and why gays and lesbians should be entitled to it. In the first story,
marriage is a bundle of rights and obligations pertaining to how each member of
the couple must treat each other and how outsiders must treat the couple. These
rights and obligations usually include, inter alia, the right to receive a portion of a
spouse’s estate if she dies intestate, the right to bring a wrongful death action, the
right to access spousal health, disability and accident insurance plans, the right to

Reflections on Culture, Courts and Feminism, 14 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 151, 154 (1992)
(noting how the Supreme Court has been particularly vigilant about striking down legal
presumptions rooted in the breadwinner-homemaker stereotypes).
18
GERTRUDE STEIN, EVERYBODY’S AUTOBIOGRAPHY, Ch. 4 (1937) (describing
Oakland, California as a place for which “there is no there there.”).
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assert evidentiary privileges, the right to hospital visitation and other incidents
relevant to medical treatment of a family member, and the entitlements and
responsibilities pertaining to spousal maintenance and marital property at
separation.19
These rights and obligations can often result in significant financial savings
and security for couples. The state provides these incidents of marriage to couples
because these incidents afford couples the freedom to divide labor and develop
interdependencies that promote stability and protect against dependency on the
state. States value stability for a whole host of reasons20 and almost always prefer
that dependents’ needs are met in private, thereby relieving any responsibility that
might fall to the state.
This narrative of marriage suggests that states create and sanction marriage
because they benefit from it. It is a narrative that is particularly susceptible to
equality arguments for SSM because opponents of SSM have difficulty explaining
why gay and lesbian couples need to be denied the concrete benefits of marriage,
or how the state could possibly be hurt by providing these stabilizing benefits to
gay and lesbian couples.21
The problem with this story of marriage is that while it often forces the state
to provide all of the legal rights and obligations of marriage, it does not compel the
state to provide the symbolic benefits of marriage. Thus, the Supreme Courts of
Vermont and New Jersey found that gays and lesbians were entitled to Civil Union
status, but not marital status.22 If the bundle of rights and obligations that
accompanies marital status is what marriage is, then gays and lesbians are treated
equally once they become entitled to that bundle of rights and obligations. The
term “marriage” is a peripheral issue in the first narrative of marriage because the
first narrative of marriage defines marriage as the legal rights and obligations that
accompany it, not the symbolism in the term itself.
The second story of marriage is the one that has been told most prominently
by the U.S. Supreme Court, and it focuses much less on the concrete benefits of
marriage and much more on the symbolic benefits of marriage—most particularly,
its emotional and expressive benefits. Although not precisely clear about why or
when this right exists, the Court has ruled that states cannot deny the right to marry

19

For a more complete list of the legal rights and obligations of marriage, see Anita
Bernstein, For and Against Marriage: A Revision, 102 MICH. L. REV. 129, 149-52 (2003).
20
A stable social system is likely to be better poised to accumulate wealth, less prone
to violence, and better able to organize in times of peril than an unstable social system.
21
The Supreme Courts of Vermont and New Jersey relied on this kind of equality
reasoning in ruling that the respective states must provide Civil Union status to gay and
lesbian couples. See Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864,886-89; (Vt. 1999); Lewis v. Harris,
908 A.2d 196 213-17. (N.J. 2006).
22
Baker, 744 A.2d at 888-89; Lewis, 908 A.2d at 423. After Proposition 8 passed, the
California Supreme Court reached essentially the same conclusion. See Strauss v. Horton,
207 P.3d 48, at 70-71. (Cal. 2009).
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to poor people23 or to prisoners.24 The Court has suggested that the right to enter
into marriage is grounded in privacy doctrine because of the critical role that
families play in our private lives,25 but it has also emphasized the public aspect of
marriage. Thus, marriage can be both “the most important relation in life” and “the
foundation of society.”26 It “affects personal rights of the deepest significance . . .
[but] . . . [i]t also touches basic interests of society.”27
In Turner v. Safley, the Court wrote that marriage is “an expression of
emotional support and public commitment . . . [and] an expression of personal
dedication.”28 Plaintiffs in New Jersey picked up on this expressive element of
marriage: it is the “ultimate expression of love, commitment and honor that you
can give another human being.”29 “[O]thers know immediately that you have taken
steps to create something special.”30 This story of marriage corresponds with what
Peggy Cooper Davis has described as the nineteenth century human rights
ideology that supported the recently enslaved’s right to marry. She describes this
ideology as grounded in the “conviction that . . . [there is a] . . . human capacity to
make life-defining choices, and [a] human drive to do so, . . . such that every
person has an inalienable entitlement to construct a life on chosen terms . . . .”31
The decision to marry is a decision about who one wants to be. This understanding
of marriage suggests that the decision to enter into marriage is a personal one
because it involves critical issues of self-determination, but it is also a public one

23

Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 391 (1978) (striking down Wisconsin law that
denied marriage licenses to people who could not show that they would not be in arrears on
their child support payments).
24
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 79 (1987) (striking down prison regulation that
prevented male prisoners from marrying).
25
Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 386. In explaining why the right to marry is fundamental, the
Court cited almost every constitutional case having anything to do with parenting,
procreation, marriage or other family relationships. Id.
26
Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888).
27
Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 230 (1945).
28
Turner, 482 U.S. at 95.
29
Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 225-26 (Poritz, C.J., concurring and dissenting)
(quoting plaintiffs’ briefs).
30
Id.
31
Peggy Cooper Davis & Carol Gilligan, Reconstructing Law and Marriage, 11 THE
GOOD SOCIETY 57, 58 (2002), available at http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/good_society/v011
/11.3davis.html. Given how strongly gendered most marital lives are, it may seem odd to
think of the decision to marry as a decision to construct life on terms of one’s choosing. If
marriage gives one little opportunity to avoid gender roles, then choosing to marry hardly
seems like a decision to construct one’s own terms, unless marriage offers a unique
opportunity to live life in a particularly gendered way. I make use of story #6 to suggest
this view. See infra notes 87-98 and accompanying text.
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because marriage serves as a form of public expression.32 Expressing one’s
commitment to another helps one become the self one wants to be.
Not surprisingly, this story of marriage as expression and self-determination
fits quite squarely into fundamental rights analysis.33 It is a right to express who
one is by making a public commitment to another. The right to make this
simultaneously personal and public declaration is very important to human
development and happiness, and therefore, the state must be very careful not to
interfere with it. It is worth noting though, how distinct this theory of entitlement is
from the first one. The first story sees marriage as a legal construct, a state-created
bundle of rights and obligations. The second story sees marriage as an institution—
like religion, perhaps—that serves human interests and values and with which the
state should not interfere.34
The problem with this second story of marriage is that what gives marriage its
expressive potential and symbolic meaning is its social and historical context.
Getting married makes a statement because of what people understand marriage to
mean. Marriage has been a part of our social and political structure for a very long
time. Marriage and the family that it instantly creates is still an organizing
principle for many people’s lives. But marriage to someone of the same sex might
not be. What “others know immediately”35 about the statement one makes when
one gets married depends on what others understand marriage to mean. I do not
have, and no one would realistically maintain that I have, a fundamental right to
marry my dog. It would be ludicrous for me to maintain such a right because no
32

Cass Sunstein has suggested that the right to marry counts as fundamental “because
of the expressive benefits that come from official state-licensed marriage.” Cass R.
Sunstein, The Right to Marry, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 2081, 2096 (2005).
33
In Loving v. Virgina, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967), the Court declared that marriage was
“one of the ‘basic civil rights of man,’ fundamental to our very existence and survival,”
(citing Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) and Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190
(1888)). Loving involved an anti-miscegenation statute, which the court struck down as
unconstitutional, but it did so without giving any explanation as to why marriage was a
fundamental right. The cases it cited, Skinner and Maynard, involved, respectively, a law
requiring the sterilization of certain criminals and an action for divorce. Thus the Court
declared that marriage was a fundamental right in Loving, but it made no attempt, as it did
in Zablocki and Turner, to explain why.
34
The relationship between state-sponsored marriage and religion is a long and still
extant one. In the Anglo-American tradition, secular authorities began to wrest control over
marriage from ecclesiastical authorities starting somewhere around the 16th century, but
the state was never too eager to unmoor marriage from its ecclesiastical roots. Hence, the
basic understanding of what marriage was (a lifelong union of a man and a woman, for
which consent was necessary and one of the primary purposes of which was the rearing of
children) did not change significantly when the state began to assert control. Indeed, even
today, the degree to which the state cedes control over marriage to religious authorities is
striking given the Constitutional commandment to separate church and state. See
KATHARINE K. BAKER & KATHARINE B. SILBAUGH, FAMILY LAW 6-7, 11-12 (Aspen
Publishers 2009).
35
See Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d at 196 (N.J. 2006).
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one would know what it means (sharing a home with my dog? Sharing material
goods? A sexual relationship?). Because the expressive value of marriage is
dependent on marriage’s social meaning and because that social meaning is
contested, the right to marry depends, as critics of the theory have maintained, on a
common definition of marriage.36
A third story of marriage was told by the California Supreme Court in the In
re Marriage Cases.37 This story understands marriage to be a state-conferred title,
a blessing of sorts, pursuant to which a couple secures status from the state. With
this state-conferred status comes the respect and dignity of others. In this version
of marriage, the state-conferred benefits of marriage are inextricably intertwined
with the emotional benefits of marriage because one helps determine the other. The
personal well-being that comes from marriage comes in part from the respect and
dignity that is afforded marital status. The California Court wrote that the “core
substantive rights [of marriage] include . . . the opportunity of an individual to
establish . . . an officially recognized and protected family . . . [that is] . . . entitled
to the same respect and dignity as marriage.”38 The California Court found this
narrative of marriage to be susceptible to both fundamental rights and equality
arguments, but the court’s reasoning is a little odd.
In California, when the Court decided In re Marriage Cases, the legislature
had already provided gays and lesbians with the full panoply of rights and
obligations that marriage brings (story #1). Domestic Partnership (as it was called
in California) was not enough, the court said, because Domestic Partnership did
not command the same respect and dignity as marriage. For people who believe
that SSM will be disruptive to some of the most important social relations in
society, this must just sound strange. As a fundamental rights argument, the court’s
story of marriage proves too much.
The California court found that it is not just respect and equal treatment from
the state that matters for the right to marry, it is respect and dignity from the
public.39 But what if someone has no respect for the institution of SSM and does
not want to dignify it with her blessing? As a private citizen, surely she has the
right to think whatever she wants about SSM. The California Supreme Court may
think that a state license means that a married gay couple will be respected in the
same way as a straight couple, but given the sizable number of people who oppose
SSM, it is not at all clear why the court thinks that respect and dignity from others
will automatically follow. Indeed, given the success of Proposition 8, one might be
able to say that the California Supreme Court was simply wrong. The respect and
36

See Koppelman, supra note 13 (“The fact that you really, really, want to get
married can’t be the basis for a constitutional right. Otherwise, the incest and polygamy
laws would be in trouble too.”).
37
In re Marriage Cases, 193 P.2d 384 (Cal. 2008).
38
Id. at 399.
39
Id. at 444 (“[O]ne of the core elements embodied in the state constitutional right to
marry is the right of an individual and a couple to have their own official family
relationship accorded respect and dignity.” A couple is “constitutionally entitled” to
“respect and dignity.”).
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dignity of others does not follow the state’s conferral of marriage, yet it was the
respect and dignity from others that the Court said was a key part of the
fundamental right to marry.40
The California Court’s marriage narrative seems much less odd in the context
of equality theory. The state cannot grant domestic partnerships for gay people and
marriage for straight people even if they are identical legal statuses because, as
virtually everyone who has ever had a Civics class in this country knows, separate
is not equal. The cite here is to Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka,41 in which
the Supreme Court famously held that African-American children had an equal
right to the same education as white children. The Supreme Court did not hold that
African-American children had a fundamental right to a decent education.42 Brown
was only an equality case. The maintenance of white and non-white regimes, wrote
the Court, “generates a feeling of inferiority . . . and may affect [African-American
children’s] hearts and minds,” because “the policy of separating the races is
usually interpreted as demonstrating the inferiority of the negro group.”43
According to the California Supreme Court, the maintenance of two marital
regimes runs a comparable risk of creating “second class citizenship”44 for
Domestic Partnerships.
The Supreme Court of Connecticut, in Kerrigan v. Commissioner, augmented
this equality analysis somewhat by pointing out that “private biases may be outside
the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect.”45
Just because some people may not afford SSM respect and dignity does not mean
that the law can formally acknowledge that lack of respect. The cite here was to
Palmore v. Sidoti,46 a case in which the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that courts could
40

To the extent that the Court was trying to say members of the public should give
same-sex couples respect and dignity, it was expressing an aspiration, not explaining the
content of a fundamental right. To the extent that it was saying that the state must
encourage members of the public to afford same-sex couples respect and dignity because
the state encourages members of the public to do the same for married couples, then it is
making an equality argument. See infra notes 41-46.
41
Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
42
Id.
43
Id. at 494 (quoting district court in Kansas).
44
In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 442.
45
Kerrigan v. Comm’r, 957 A.2d 407, 479 (Conn. 2008) (citing Palmore v. Sidoti,
466 U.S. 429, 433-34 (1984)). The Connecticut Legislature, like the California Legislature,
had already instituted full Civil Union status when Kerrigan was decided. Id. The Court in
Kerrigan suggested that it was using sex equality doctrine, not race equality doctrine to
reach its result, see Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 476 (citing United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S.
515 (1996)), but its dismissal of Civil Unions as inherently unequal relies on and reads
much more like Brown v. Board of Education than United States v. Virginia. See Kerrigan,
957 A.2d at 418-419 (citing Brown and In Re Marriage Cases, but no sex discrimination
cases for the proposition that separate is not equal). For a discussion of the critical
differences between Brown and United States v. Virginia, see infra notes 205-225 and text
accompanying.
46
Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 434 (1984).
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not take into account the fact that a white child raised in a mixed race household
might suffer hardship in a way that she would not if she was raised in an all white
household because to do so would legitimize racist biases. Together, say the courts
of California and Connecticut, Brown and Palmore demonstrate how parallel
marital regimes for same-sex couples violate basic principles of equality because
of the way those different regimes will be valued socially, and therefore, gays and
lesbians must be entitled to marriage itself.
The Supreme Court of Iowa took a different path to gay marriage. Unlike
California and Connecticut, Iowa did not provide either Civil Unions or Domestic
Partnership benefits for gay and lesbian couples so the Iowa court was not deciding
whether separate could be equal.47 It was deciding whether a “mini-DOMA,”48
passed by the Iowa legislature in 1998, could define marriage as between a man
and a woman. The Iowa Court adopted a story of marriage much like story #1.
Relying on an earlier loss of consortium case, the court defined marriage as
“rooted in the necessity of providing an institutional basis for defining the
fundamental relational rights and responsibilities of persons in organized
society.”49 But, it also found that gays and lesbian were a suspect class and any
classification that singled them out for different treatment deserved heightened
scrutiny.50
The mini-DOMA probably made the Iowa court’s discrimination analysis
easier. Prior to 1993, when Baehr was decided in Hawaii, few states had even
bothered to restrict marriage to opposite-sex couples. The opposite-sex definition
was assumed. Legislative enactments that did so after Baehr were clearly designed
to prohibit same-sex couples from marrying. As the Iowa Supreme Court wrote,
“[b]y purposefully placing civil marriage outside the realistic reach of gay and
lesbian individuals, the ban on same-sex civil marriages differentiates implicitly on
the basis of sexual orientation.”51 This kind of “animus toward the class that it
affects”52 is much more transparent in the mini-DOMAs of the 1990s than in the
myriad of marriage statutes that pre-dated them.
By focusing on the 1998 statute, not the historical and almost universal
understanding of marriage as between a man and a woman, it was easier for the
Iowa court to say that an opposite-sex requirement was discrimination against gays
and lesbians. The court never reached the question of whether a comparable status,
like civil unions or domestic partnerships, that provide “an institutional basis for

47

Varnum v. O’Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009).
Mini-DOMA is the phrase used to refer to the multiple state statutes passed in the
wake of Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d at 44, 44 (Haw. 1993), and in the wake of the federal
Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006), which defined marriage as between a man
and a woman.
49
Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at, 883 (citing Laws v. Griep, 332 N.W.2d 339, 341 (Iowa
1983)).
50
Id.
51
Id. at 885.
52
Id. (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996)).
48
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defining the fundamental relational rights and responsibilities of persons in
organized society,” could be equal.53
Thus, the equality arguments for SSM have relied mostly on racial equality
doctrine and have focused on gays and lesbians as a class, not on the question of
what marriage is. California, Connecticut and Iowa all found that gays and lesbians
were a suspect class. California and Connecticut then went on to rule that the
alternative marriage regimes for gays and lesbians violated the racial equality
principle that separate is not equal. Iowa found that the state statute defining
marriage as between a man and a woman was designed to discriminate against
gays and lesbians.54 Initially, then, it seems that equality arguments more easily
avoid the problem of defining marriage. But as the rest of the article will suggest,
the strength of equality arguments depends on a genderless conception of marriage.
II. THE OTHER SET OF STORIES
Critics of SSM have their own stories of marriage. The first of these stories
has to do with marriage as a procreative institution. This story of marriage has
probably received the most attention,55 but it is also, I will suggest, the weakest.
The second story has to do with marriage as an institution for child-rearing. The
third story has to do with marriage as an institution for gender reification. The
second and third of these stories have considerable significance for SSM
arguments. For consistency sake, I will refer to the critics’ narratives as Stories 4, 5
and 6 and the proponents’ narratives as Stories 1, 2, and 3.
Story #4 suggests that marriage is an institution designed for procreation. For
years, the only legal way to engage in the conduct that led to procreation was to do
so within the institution of marriage. Recently, a group of Catholic theologians,
known to some as the New Natural Law Theorists,56 have gone so far as to suggest
that marriage can be restricted to opposite-sex couples because married
heterosexual sex is an inherent good in a way that no other form of sexual
expression is.57 Others have done much to refute this latter point about the inherent
superiority of married heterosexual sex.58 It is, as the authors of the view concede,

53

Id. at 883.
Massachusetts, which had neither an alternative marriage regime nor a miniDOMA to evaluate, did not apply any heighted scrutiny and simply found that restricting
marriage to opposite-sex couples was irrational. See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health,
798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
55
See Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 901-02.
56
See KOPPELMAN, supra note 16, at 79.
57
See Robert P. George & Gerard V. Bradley, Marriage and the Liberal Imagination,
84 GEO. L.J. 301, passim (1995); see also John M. Finis, Law, Morality, and “Sexual
Orientation,” 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1049, passim (1994).
58
See Mary Becker, Women Morality and Sexual Orientation, 8 UCLA WOMEN’S
L.J. 165, 185 (1998); Andrew Koppelman, Is Marriage Inherently Heterosexual?, 42 AM.
J. JURIS. 51, 57-62 (1997).
54
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a viewpoint that one either implicitly understands or one does not.59 As one who
does not, it makes little sense for me to comment on it here.
Regardless of one’s view on the superiority of married heterosexual
intercourse, any student of literature or history is well aware that marriage has
never been particularly good at policing sexuality. One of the purposes of marriage
may have been to channel sexuality into marital relationships, but sex has
happened outside of marriage throughout history.60 If marriage’s primary purpose
had been to restrict sexual activity to marriage, marriage would have broken down
as an institution. It simply is not up to the defined task. Policing extra-marital
sexual activity is and always has been extraordinarily difficult. The activity takes
place in private. There are no non-culpable witnesses, and unless the participants
are willing to implicate themselves, the activity is virtually impossible to prove.
Until very recently, the only way to know whether sex happened was if a
pregnancy resulted, but as long as the woman who got pregnant was married to
someone, there was no way of proving that the sex was extra-marital.61
What marriage has been much better at is providing an institution for childrearing. Marriage is not about making babies (Story #4), but about taking care of
them. This is the fifth story of marriage—marriage as an institution designed to
ensure optimal child-rearing. A child born to a marriage (regardless of the actual
origins of his or her genetic material) has a mother and a father whose
responsibility it is to provide materially, emotionally, physically and spiritually.
William Blackstone understood and endorsed this view. He wrote “[t]he main end
and design of marriage . . . [is] to ascertain and fix upon some certain person to
whom the care, the protection, the maintenance and the education of the children
should belong . . . .”62 The marital presumption of paternity, which until quite
recently was practically irrebuttable,63 is the strongest indicator of the law’s
allegiance to the story of marriage as an institution for child-rearing.

59

George & Bradley, supra note 57, at 307 (“In the end, we think, one either
understands that spousal genital intercourse has a special significance as instantiating a
basic, noninstrumental value, or something blocks that understanding and one does not
perceive correctly.”).
60
See generally LAWRENCE STONE, THE FAMILY, SEX AND MARRIAGE IN ENGLAND
1500-1800 (1977) (documenting extra marital sexual activity); Harold T. Christensen &
Christina F. Gregg, Changing Sex Norms in America and Scandinavia, 32 J. MARRIAGE &
FAM. 616, 616-27 (1970) (summarizing studies of premarital sex); 2 Samuel 11:1-5
(Bathsheba and King David).
61
Genetic testing now allows us to test whether there has been an exchange of bodily
fluids and to identify the source of those fluids. DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY § 19-1.4 (1997).
62
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *443, *455.
63
See generally Katharine K. Baker, Bargaining or Biology: The History and Future
of Paternity Law and Parental Status, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 22-25 (2004)
(explaining how, without genetic testing, proving paternity was so difficult that litigants
could not overcome the marital presumption).
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The problem with this narrative of marriage, for opponents of SSM, is that
gays and lesbians can rear children within marriage too. Indeed, the reason that
many gays and lesbians want to get married is because they want to raise children.
To foreclose that option, opponents of SSM have to add an addendum to Story #5
indicating that the best way to rear children is to provide them with both of their
biological parents. Thus, the full version of Story #5 is that marriage is for childrearing and because child-rearing is done best by biological parents, marriage is for
two people who, together, can be biological parents.64
The addendum about biological parents may or may not be true. Reliable
evaluations about what matters most for optimal child-rearing are very difficult to
produce. The studies that scholars do have access to are varied, rarely longitudinal,
and wildly disparate in result.65 There are no reliable studies suggesting that bigendered role modeling really matters; nor are there studies proving that it does not
matter, and many people think that a parent of each gender is good for children.66
To be reliable, studies of child welfare must have a sufficient number of
subjects and sufficient heterogeneity, yet control for class, culture and a host of
other differences.67 After reviewing the existing studies of gay parenting, the Iowa
Supreme Court expressed doubt that children need a mother and a father, but the
court did not mention the substantial body of evidence suggesting that children
raised by their biological parents perform better on a host of measures.68 Probably
most significantly, for the SSM issue, recent studies strongly indicate that children
growing up in blended families have more trouble than children growing up in
biological nuclear families.69 Among most demographers and social scientists who
study family structure and child well-being, it is now common wisdom that, on

64

The one exception to this is adoption, which opponents concede deprives children
of their biological parents and provides non-biological parents with children, but adoptions
are approved only when in the best interest of the child. See Monte Neil Stewart,
Genderless Marriage, Institutional Realities and Judicial Elision, 1 DUKE J. CONST. L. &
PUB. POL’Y 1, 15-18 (2006).
65
See William Meezan & Jonathan Rauch, Gay Marriage, Same-Sex Parenting, and
America’s Children, 15 THE FUTURE OF CHILD. 97, 100-06 (2005) (explaining the
problems with existing studies of children of same-sex couples).
66
See Margaret Somerville, What About the Children?, in DIVORCING MARRIAGE:
UNVEILING THE DANGERS IN CANADA’S NEW SOCIAL EXPERIMENT 63, 67 (Daniel Cere &
Douglas Farrow eds., 2004) [hereinafter “DIVORCING MARRIAGE”] (“Those who believe
that children need and have a right to both a mother and a father, preferably their own
biological parents, oppose same-sex marriage because . . . it would mean that marriage
could not continue to institutionalize and symbolize the inherently procreative capacity
between the partners . . . .”).
67
See Meezan & Rauch, supra note 65.
68
See generally Amy Wax, Traditionalism, Pluralism, and Same-Sex Marriage, 59
RUTGERS L. REV. 377, 403-05 (2007) (citing studies).
69
Id.
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average, children raised by their own married, biological parents have an easier
time than children raised in other circumstances.70
Nonetheless, the majority of children in this country are raised in other
circumstances.71 The environments in which children are raised are simply too
varied for legislators or other policy makers to make reliable categorical rules
about optimal child-raising.72 That is probably why we allow adoption even though
there is strong evidence that adoption is often taxing on children.73 It is why many
states allow single parents to adopt even though most people agree that two parents
are better than one.74 It may be why we countenance step-families even though
many children seem to fare worse in step-families than in single-parent families.75
Most of the studies of gay families with children suggest that the children are
not harmed by the same gender of their parents.76 Perhaps, for reasons we have yet
to identify, a child raised by a biological mother and her non-biologically related
70

Lisa Gennetian, One or Two Parent? Half or Step Siblings? The Effect of Family
Structure on Young Children’s Achievement, 18 J. POPULATION ECON. 415, 415-36 (2005)
(for educational outcomes, children reared in traditional nuclear families do much better
than those reared in other family structures); Donna K. Ginther & Robert A. Pollak, Family
Structure and Children’s Educational Outcomes: Blended Families, Stylized Facts, and
Descriptive Regressions, 41 DEMOGRAPHY 671, 676 (2004); SARA MCLANAHAN & GARY
SANDEFUR, GROWING UP WITH A SINGLE PARENT: WHAT HURTS, WHAT HELPS 1 (1994)
(children raised by both biological parents do substantially better along several metrics than
children raised by single parent or biological parent and step-parent).
71
See MCLANAHAN & SANDEFUR, supra note 70, at 2-3 (“Well over half of the
children born in 1992 will spend all or some of their childhood apart from one of their
parents.”).
72
Shelly Lundberg & Robert A. Pollak, The American Family and Family
Economics, 21 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 3, 19 (2007) (“Because family structure is
intertwined with other parental characteristics that affect children, a causal relationship
between family structure and child outcomes is difficult to establish.”).
73
See generally DAVID M. BRODZINSKY ET AL., BEING ADOPTED: THE LIFELONG
SEARCH FOR SELF 7-10 (Anchor Books 1992).
74
JUNE CARBONE, FROM PARTNERS TO PARENTS: THE SECOND REVOLUTION IN
FAMILY LAw 118 (Columbia Univ. Press 2000) (Describing as “irrefutable” the evidence
that, “all else being equal, two parents are better than one,” but noting considerable
disagreement about what makes “all else equal.”).
75
See Wax, supra note 68, at 403; Gennetian, supra note 70, at 431 for outcomes of
step-families.
76
Judith Stacey & Timothy J. Biblorze, (How) Does the Sexual Orientation of
Parents Matter?, 66 AM. SOC. REV. 159, 162-64 (2001) (most current research indicates
that there is no difference in development between children that live with heterosexual
parents and children who live with same-sex parents); Katrien Vanfraussen et al., Family
Functioning in Donor Families Created by Donor Insemination 73 AM. J.
ORTHOPSYCHIATRY, 78, 78-90 (2003) (no differences in how parents and children in gay
and straight families perceived the quality of their relationships); Raymond Chan et al.,
Psychosocial Adjustment Among Children Conceived via Donor Insemination by Lesbian
and Heterosexual Mothers, 69 CHILD. DEVELOPMENT 443, 443-57 (sexual orientation of
parents had no significant impact on psychological well-being of their children.).
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husband struggles more than a child raised by a biological mother and her female
partner or a biological father and his male partner.77 Perhaps children that would be
raised in a household with two gay parents if a state allows SSM will otherwise be
raised in a household with only one parent if the state prohibits SSM. Perhaps
having only one parent would be worse. But we do not know. Our predictive
power when it comes to optimizing child outcomes given the situations children
find themselves in is woefully deficient.
One fact is certain. Children in gay households are not going to be raised in
the one family structure that social science has so far identified as being the most
likely to be good for children. That fact is hardly dispositive, however. Most
children in this country are probably not raised in that optimal family structure.
And, there may be other family structures that are comparably good for children,
but we have yet to identify them.
The Supreme Courts of Vermont, Massachusetts and New Jersey made much
of the fact that their state legislatures had already enacted various protections for
gay adoption, and that therefore it made no sense for the legislatures to preference
straight over gay parenting.78 But, adoptive parents are always treated differently
than other parents. A single person is allowed to adopt and parent a child on his or
her own, even though we do not give a single person the exclusive right to parent a
child born as a result of heterosexual intercourse.79 Allowing gay men and women
to enter into second-parent adoptions80 says that the legislature thinks a child is
better off with two parents than with one. It does not necessarily mean that the
legislature thinks there is no difference between two parents of the same sex and
two parents of the opposite sex.
Most important, all potential adopters have to be screened. No one is allowed
to adopt domestically unless they have passed the licensing requirements for
parenthood.81 Non-adoptive parents do not have to get licensed.82 They get parental
77

One potentially important factor might be when the non-biological parent joined the
family unit. Children living in a “blended” family may do just as well as children living in
traditional nuclear family if those children never knew any other family structure or any
other parent. This kind of non-biological-parent-there-from-the-start arrangement is
probably more common in gay and lesbian households.
78
Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864,881-82 (Vt. 1999); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub.
Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 963-64 (Mass. 2003); Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 213. (N.J.
2006).
79
Both the child and the other genetic contributor have the right to establish parentage
in the genetic father. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, § 602, ULA PARENTAGE § 602 (2002).
80
“Second parent adoptions” refers to the practice of allowing a second same-sex
parent to adopt a child who only has one legal parent. See LESLIE HARRIS ET AL., FAMILY
LAW 927, n.10 (3d ed. 2005).
81
States investigate all potential adoptive parents before approving an adoption. See,
e.g., Uniform Adoption Act, §2-203 (1994) (detailing the requirements for investigating a
potential adopters home including determining “whether the individual is suited to be an
adoptive parent.”).
82
See Uniform Parentage Act, supra note 79, at § 201 (detailing when men and
women are presumed to be fathers and mothers of a child).
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status by virtue of genetics or marriage. In allowing gay adoptions, legislatures
could be saying that gays and lesbians can be parents only if they are genetically
related to the child or if they are licensed as a parent. That is very different than
what marriage has traditionally done which is to assign parental status to a spouse,
regardless of genetic connection or parenting skills.
The ambiguity of the evidence regarding what matters in child-rearing
explains why the constitutionality of the SSM issue is so important. Given the
inconclusive data, a legislature that thinks that marriage is an institution designed
primarily for the rearing of children may rationally reject gay marriage.83
Legislators may not want to channel adults into families that will deprive children
born into that family of any chance of being raised by their biological parents.
Infertile couples or couples who do not want children may be allowed to marry
because no children are born into those marriages.84 States cannot prove that more
children will be worse off if we further sanction non-biological parenting, but
neither can proponents of SSM prove that biological connection makes no
difference. The burden of proof becomes critical.
If marriage is a fundamental right, or if gays and lesbians have a
constitutionally protected equality right to get married, the burden is on the state to
prove that having both a mother and a father is critical.85 This the state cannot do.
83

The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts disagreed with this conclusion,
finding that there was no rational reason to prevent gays and lesbians from marrying and
therefore the strength of either a fundamental right or an equality argument was
unimportant. The Court wrote that denying same-sex couples the right to marry would not
in any way ensure that more children would be born into marital families because gays and
lesbians would just have children outside of marriage, and then the children would not be
able to enjoy the benefits of marriage. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 963 (“The department has
offered no evidence that forbidding marriage to people of the same sex will increase the
number of couples choosing to enter into opposite-sex marriage in order to have and raise
children.”). The state may not have offered this evidence, but it hardly seems necessary. I
know of no one who disputes a strong history of people who may have been inclined to
enter into relationships with people of their own sex, but who nevertheless got married to
people of the opposite sex and had children. One of the purposes of state sponsored
marriage is to channel adults into certain kinds of relationships. See Carl E. Schneider, The
Channeling Function in Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 495, 497 (1992). That is what
family law does. Binary, monogamous lifelong relationships are hardly artifacts of nature.
The law may not succeed in channeling everyone into what it sees as the ideal
relationships, but it does not need to be 100% successful (or even narrowly tailored) in
order to be considered rational. It would seem fully rational for a legislature to conclude
that if there is no SSM, people who might enter into a SSM, will choose instead to enter
into an opposite-sex marriage to raise children.
84
If those couples “have” children, they adopt them and that is only done if in the best
interest of the children. See, e.g., Uniform Adoption Act, supra note 81 § 3-703 (“The
Court shall grant a petition for adoption if it determines that the adoption will be in the best
interest of the minor . . . .”).
85
Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 899, n.26. (Iowa 2009). The Iowa Supreme
Court reasoned that because gays and lesbians were a protected class, the opposite-sex
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But if there is neither a fundamental right nor an equality right to marry, the burden
is on SSM advocates to show that a policy favoring one parent of each gender is
irrational. This, proponents of SSM probably cannot do. As a matter of policy, it
might be extraordinarily wrong-headed to preclude two committed people of the
same sex who very much want to parent with each other from doing so, but, given
the evidence of what situations are better and worse for children, a reasonable
legislator might conclude otherwise.86
This leads us then to the sixth marriage narrative, marriage as a promoter and
producer of gender roles. This story of marriage will probably be jarring to some.
Perhaps because it can be so jarring, courts have not engaged it significantly,
except to dismiss it categorically and without discussion.87 One finds this discourse
of inherently gendered marriage mostly in the academic writings by opponents of
SSM. The story goes something like this:
Marriage is the primary institution through which gender is
produced and realized. By acting as such, marriage serves as a critical
source of identity for both men and women. Marriage creates a home
environment marked by complementary, separate but equal gender roles.
When men and women fulfill those roles they become more productive,
responsible and happy citizens.
This understanding of marriage is gleaned from many different descriptions of
marriage. For instance, one scholar claims that marriage is “the central cultural site
of male-female relations.”88 It is “an institution that interacts with a unique socialsexual ecology in human life. It bridges the male-female divide.”89 Another author
comments that marriage has “universal features” that include being “supported by

requirement for marriage was subject to heightened scrutiny. Id. Therefore, the burden was
on the state to show that gay parenting was not as good for children as straight parenting.
Id.
86
Proponents of SSM often also point out that many opposite-sex couples get married
without any intention of child-rearing. That fact does not render irrational legislative efforts
to try to use marriage to ensure that children are raised by their biological parents. It just
shows that marriage restrictions are underinclusive if the purpose is to use marriage to
make sure that children are raised by their biological parents. But if stricter scrutiny is not
triggered, than that underinclusiveness does not render SSM restrictions unconstitutional.
87
Both the California and Massachusetts Supreme Courts simply stated that SSM
would not fundamentally change the institution of marriage. See Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at
965 n.28 (dismissing dissent’s claim that the majority was changing the institution of
marriage itself because the dissent’s argument hewed too close to the idea that men and
women are different); In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 421 (Cal. 2008) (stating that
SSM would not “change, modify or . . . deinstitutionalize the existing institution of
marriage.”).
88
Daniel Cere, War of the Ring, in DIVORCING MARRIAGE, supra note 66, at 9, 14.
89
Id. at 11 (citing the work of evolutionary psychologists Margo Wilson and Martin
Daly).
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authority and incentives” and the “interdependence of men and women.”90
According to these commentators, bringing men and women together has been “the
massive cultural effort of every human society at all times and in all places.”91
Other scholars write that “[t]he status bestowed by marriage is that of ‘wife’ and
‘husband’ and the relation between husband and wife is the form of life that
marriage alone creates . . . .”92
Marriage creates the “social identities” of husband and wife and those social
identities (which are formed by social norms and expectations) are very different
than the social identity of “partner.”93 “[B]oth spouses gain from . . . the benefits
that come from faithfully fulfilling one’s chosen duties as . . . husband or wife.”94
Marriage “sustains a complex form of social interdependency between men and
women.”95 “Norms of trust, fidelity, sacrifice and providership . . . give [married]
men clear directions about how they should act . . . [and] . . . [m]ost men seek to
maintain their social status by abiding by society’s norms.”96 “Norms of adult
maturity associated with marriage encourage adults to spend and save in a more
responsible fashion . . . . [F]or many men, marriage is a right of passage that
introduces them fully into an adult world of responsibility and self-control.”97
With an extensive set of cultural norms and expectations about what it means
to be married, i.e., to be a husband and wife, marriage channels men and women
into gender roles that allow each to identify with and achieve the cultural ideals of
masculine and feminine. If we allow people of the same sex to marry, we alter the
essentially gendered nature of marriage and we put at risk the separate but equal
masculine and feminine roles that marriage has traditionally reified. Having people
live into and fulfill those roles has proven to be immensely beneficial for both

90

Katharine Young & Paul Nathanson, The Future of an Experiment, in DIVORCING
MARRIAGE, supra note 66, at 41, 45.
91
Id. at 43.
92
F.C. DeCoste, The Halpern Transformation: Same-Sex Marriage, Civil Society, and
the Limits of Liberal Law, 41 ALTA. L. REV. 619, 625 (2003).
93
Stewart, supra note 64, at 19.
94
THE WITHERSPOON INSTITUTE, MARRIAGE AND THE PUBLIC GOOD: TEN PRINCIPLES
[hereinafter “WITHERSPOON”] 12 (2006), available at http://www.princetonprinciples.org/
files/Marriage and the Public Good.pdf.
95
COUNCIL ON FAMILY LAW, THE FUTURE OF FAMILY LAW: LAW AND THE
MARRIAGE CRISIS IN NORTH AMERICA 20 (New York: Institute for American Values
2005).
96
WITHERSPOON, supra note 94, at 21.
97
Id. at 20. As these last few quotes indicate, much of the argument against SSM
suggests that it is the benefits that married men receive individually and provide to the
social whole that makes marriage so valuable. Married men measure significantly higher
for psychological and physical health than do single men. Married women measure higher
than single women, but not as much higher as men. See infra note 98. Non-married adult
men are less happy, more violent, less responsible and less integrated into their
communities. See STEVEN NOCK, MARRIAGE IN MEN’S LIVES 6-8 (Oxford Univ. Press, Inc.
1998).
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society as a whole and individuals in particular.98 As Steven Nock writes, “It is in
the intimacy of married life that men and women define themselves as persons
rather than employees, students, voters, faithful believers or any number of other
public identities. One of the most important dimensions of personal identity is
gender.”99
One response to this story may be that SSM will not destroy gendered
marriage; it will just allow for an alternative. If heterosexual people still want to
live gendered lives, SSM will not prevent them from doing so. The rejoinder to
this argument is subtle, but not necessarily weak. By unmooring marriage from its
gendering effects, SSM puts in jeopardy the way in which most married people
have learned to express themselves as spouses, the way in which they have learned
to live in a loving sexual relationship, and the way in which they have come to
understand who they are as participating, responsible members of society. What
allows marriage to do this is the rich set of norms, many of them gendered, which
define how married people are to behave. The strong social pressure to conform to
these norms restricts people’s freedoms but allows them to live into responsible
masculinity and femininity.100 Adhering to the social norms of marriage and
accepting the responsibilities of marital roles allows for a kind of self-expression
and self-development that is both confining and ennobling.101 Those social norms
98

There is fairly consistent evidence that marriage makes both men and women
happier, healthier and wealthier. Steven Nock writes “The many beneficial effects of
marriage are well-known. Married people are generally healthier; they live longer, earn
more, have better health and better sex lives, and are happier than their unmarried
counterparts. . . . Some disagreement may exist about the magnitude of such effects, but
they are almost certainly the result of marriage, rather than self-selection.” See NOCK,
supra note 97, at 3 (citing numerous studies). For a more recent study, see Alois Stutzer &
Bruno S. Frey, Does Marriage Make People Happy or do Happy People get Married?, 35
J. SOCIO-ECON. 326, 327-34 (2006) (finding that marriage continues to be highly correlated
with happiness for both men and women and that “[i]t is unlikely that . . . selection effects
can explain the entire difference in well-being between singles and married people.”); see
also Walter R. Gove et al., Does Marriage Have Positive Effects on the Psychological
Well-Being of the Individual?, 24 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 122, 125 (1983) (marital
status is the most powerful predictor of mental health for both men and women).
99
NOCK, supra note 97, at 42.
100
Bruce Hafen writes about the restrictions of family life this way, “the same
relationships . . . that seem to tie us down are, paradoxically, the sources of strength most
likely to lift us up.” Bruce C. Hafen, Individualism and Autonomy in Family Law: The
Waning of Belonging, 1991 BYU L. REV. 1, 41 (1991).
101
For more on how accepting the roles in marriage is both an expressive and
constitutive act, see Milton C. Regan, Jr., Spousal Privilege and the Meanings of Marriage,
81 VA. L. REV 2045, 2088-89 (1995). Regan’s work builds on Meir Dan-Cohen,
Responsibility and the Boundaries of the Self, 105 HARV. L. REV. 959, 959-1001 (1992)
(articulating and analyzing the constitutive responsibility paradigm) and it is similar to how
Katharine Bartlett has described parenthood. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Re-Expressing
Parenthood, 98 YALE L.J. 293, 301 (1988) (citing the work of Nel Noddings, Caring: A
Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education 14 (Univ. of Cali. 1984), and
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will change if, for instance, husband will not necessarily mean “provider” and wife
will not necessarily mean “caretaker.”102
Admittedly, some couples already alter aspects of these roles. But few couples
abandon them completely.103 The more marriage’s gendered conventions are
challenged, the less stable they become and the less likely they are to be reinforced by broad social consensus. Without that broad social understanding of
marriage as gendered, the gendered norms that go with it will die and so will the
roles through which many people have found meaning in their lives.
For those who find this understanding of marriage somewhat alienating or just
alien, it is important to recognize two distinct but important points. First, the
gendered narrative fits very easily into much of the pre-existing constitutional
discourse on marriage. One can see how marriage could be “the foundation of
society,” “the most important relation in life,”104 and “fundamental to the very
existence and survival of the race”105 because of the way in which it reifies gender,
serving both the states interest in stability and protection against dependence
(Story #1) and individuals’ interests in expression and self-determination (Story
#2). What may make marriage so important to people is the sense of belonging and
purpose that comes from accepting the restrictions and accolades that accompany
marital gender roles. These restrictions and accolades have an enormous effect on
one’s sense of self.106 They help one understand who one is. They are, as Stephen
Nock suggested, a critical part of one’s identity.107

suggesting that accepting the responsibilities of parenthood is a means of adults striving to
realize their “ennobled selves.”).
102
The argument made by opponents of SSM here is akin to those highlighted by
Jorge Aseff and Hector Chade, in an article addressing the problem of identity externalities.
One’s ability to get value out of a given institution may depend on who else is part of that
institution and thereby giving it an identity. See Jorge Aseff & Hector Chade, An Optimal
Auction with Identity-Dependent Externalities, 39 RAND J. ECON. 731, 731-32 (2008).
103
One study famously found that though the percentage of unpaid work that a wife
does in the home decreases as she earns more money relative to her husband, in those
couples where the wife actually earns more than her husband, the wives begin to do a
greater share of the housework. The authors attribute this phenomenon to the greater
importance of conforming to gendered roles with regard to unpaid work if the couple is not
conforming to those roles with regard to paid work. See Theodore N. Greenstein, Economic
Dependence, Gender, and the Division of Labor in the Home: A Replication and Extension,
62 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 322, 333 (2000).
104
See Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888); see also Williams v. North
Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 230. (1945).
105
Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 539 (1942).
106
Our sense of self comes, in part, from how others define us and most people use
some sense of social norms to guide their judgment. Think, for instance, about how good it
may feel to be called a “good husband” or a “good mother.” Or consider how bad it feels to
be called a “bad husband” or “bad mother.”
107
See NOCK, supra note 97, at 42 (“one of the most important dimensions of
personal identity is gender”).
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Thus, marriage’s ability to channel people into gender roles works at both a
private and public level. The identity that comes from being married feels like the
“intimate and personal” realm that is “central to the liberty protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment.”108 But, the norms that shape that identity are social. Part
of what it means to be married is to accept roles defined by others. That is how we
know what it means to “be a good wife” or “be a good husband”—because these
terms have social meaning. And that social meaning is gendered. According to
Story #6, the identity benefits from marriage stem from accepting assigned roles,
not creating new ones.
The second, and potentially more important, observation that flows from
Story #6 is that a great deal of social science data confirms what this gendered
story of marriage celebrates. The next Part explores more fully what the social
science data indicates about the tendency of marriage to reinforce gender.
III. THE GENDER FACTORY
As Story #1 suggested, one of the advantages of marriage is that it allows for
a division of labor and an allocation of roles within households.109 This role
division provides stability for the household, for the individuals within it and for
society as a whole.110 In the vast majority of households, this role division is also
gendered. As Sarah Berk showed in her classic book, The Gender Factory,
standard economic explanations for how and why unpaid work might be divided in
a household cannot explain the social reality of how work is divided in
households.111 Gender can. Gender predicts who does what, how much each
married partner does and why husbands and wives do not negotiate more over who
does what or how much.112 Couples do not fight over what jobs they will do
because the allocation is so patterned into who they are as gendered selves. And
the more those gendered work patterns are replicated, the more entrenched gender
roles become. Thus, the home and the marriages that define it not only reflect
gender, they create it. “[G]ender both affects and is perhaps effected through the
division of household labor. It is around household work that gender relations are
produced and reproduced on a daily basis.”113
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Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851

(1992).
109

See BERK, supra note 14, at 165 (“[W]ith respect to the apportionment of
household tasks . . . men and women may share a work environment, but do not share
much of its work.”).
110
See supra text accompanying note 20.
111
See BERK, supra note 14, at 162-65.
112
Id. at 191 (“[H]ow people interact about who does what is as stable a phenomenon
as the division of the work itself.”).
113
Id. at 165.
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Marriage increases the amount of domestic work that women do and
decreases the amount that men do.114 Married women, regardless of whether they
also work outside the home, do much more household work than their husbands.115
Studies find that even in the most egalitarian households, women perform 59% of
the domestic work.116
Marriage, particularly marriages with children, decrease women’s
commitment to paid work and increase their commitment to unpaid work. A strong
majority of married mothers work outside the home,117 but in the most recent
exhaustive study of time allocation in households with children, Suzanne Bianchi
and her colleagues found that mothers average 67% of the unpaid work in a
household, while fathers average 64% of the paid hours for a household.118
Mothers do twice as much child care as fathers.119
Mothers may be able to do more child care because they do less paid work
than fathers. Married women often leave the labor force for a short or long period.
Between 1983 and 1998, 50% of women, but only 16% of men, reported being out
of the labor force for one full year.120 Thirty percent of women, but only 5%
percent of men reported more than four years of zero earnings.121 Women with the
strongest commitment to paid labor, i.e., those who reported earnings for every
year of their prime earning years (ages 26-59), still reported working almost 500
fewer hours per year than men.122 Some women may work less than the standard
work week or standard work year; others may forego overtime opportunities when
men do not.
These differing work patterns are starkly reflected in the gender wage gap.
Most wage gap measures usually only account for workers who work full time on
an annual basis (thus excluding part-time or part-year workers, most of them

114

Beth Anne Shelton & Daphne John, Does Marital Status Make a Difference?:
Housework Among Married and Cohabiting Men and Women, 14 J. FAM. ISSUES 401, 417
(1993) (women’s domestic labor goes up with marriage); Sanjiv Gupta, The Effects of
Transitions in Marital Status on Men’s Performance of Housework, 61 J. MARRIAGE &
FAM. 700, 700-01 (1999) (men’s domestic labor goes down with marriage).
115
David Demo & Alan Acock, Family Diversity and the Division of Domestic
Labor: How Much Have Things Really Changed?, 42 FAM. RES. 323, 323-31 (1993).
116
Greenstein, supra note 103, at 333.
117
Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment Characteristics of Families
in 2005, tbl.4 (Apr. 27, 2006), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/fame
_04272006.pdf (Approximately 66% of married mothers worked outside the home in 20042005).
118
SUZANNE M. BIANCHI ET AL., CHANGING RHYTHMS OF AMERICAN FAMILY LIFE 91
(Douglas L. Anderton et al. eds., 2006).
119
Id.
120
HEIDI HARTMANN ET AL., HOW MUCH PROGRESS IN CLOSING THE LONG-TERM
EARNINGS GAP? IN THE DECLINING SIGNIFICANCE OF GENDER? 125-31 (Francine D. Blau
et al. eds., Russell Sage Foundation 2006).
121
Id.
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Id.
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women). When one includes those part-time and part-year workers and looks at
just prime earning years, women earn 38 cents for every dollar men earn.123
Most women who currently make the choice to do less paid work were raised
during what might be described as a time of maximum gender equality, with all the
benefits that Title VII, Title IX, and constitutional gender equality doctrine
afforded them.124 Yet almost half of all married mothers with children under the
age of one leave the labor force.125 One study found that mothers born after 1965
in households earning more than $120,000 a year, were more likely than not to be
at home full-time.126 Another study found that “[e]ven wives with graduate and
professional degrees do not usually work full time if their husband’s income
exceed[s] $75,000.”127
Marriage affords many women the opportunity to not work, or to work less. It
does not appear to afford men the same choice. The labor supply curve for married
women is very elastic, yet it is starkly inelastic for married men.128 If anything,
marriage increases men’s commitment to the paid labor force because if their
wives choose not to do paid work or do less of it, married men do more of it.129
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Id. at 131.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000h-6 (1965) (Title VII refers to
the prohibition on sex discrimination in employment); Educational Amendments of 1972,
20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-88 (1974) (Title IX refers to the prohibition on sex discrimination in
education). Constitutional gender discrimination doctrine is discussed infra in Part IV.
125
Claudia Wallis, The Case for Staying Home, TIME, Mar. 22, 2004, at 52. The
number of working married mothers with children under age one “fell from 59% in 1997 to
53% in 2000” and stayed “roughly the same in 2002.” That drop was most pronounced
among white well-educated women over thirty. Although six percentage points may not
seem like a huge drop in the number of working women, economists suggest that it is
significant. Id.
126
Id. Women of the same income level, raised without the benefits of legally
recognized gender equality, i.e., those born between 1946 and 1964 or baby-boomers, are
significantly less likely to be home full-time (51% of post-baby-boomer mothers are home
full-time versus 33% of baby-boomer mothers).
127
Ira Mark Ellman, Marital Roles and Declining Marriage Rates, 41 FAM. L.Q. 455,
474 (2007). This finding is based on data from the 1997 Current Population Survey. Ellman
also found that “as economic pressures decline, married American mothers increasingly
choose to work part time rather than full time, regardless of their educational level.” Id. at
475.
128
EDWARD J. MCCAFFERY, TAXING WOMEN 176-77 (1997).
129
Men with non-wage-earning spouses work more than men whose wives earn
wages, though they also earn considerably more per hour. One study found that men with
non-working spouses work 4% more than men with working spouses, but that they earn
20% more than their peers with working spouses. Tamar Lewin, Men Whose Wives Work
Earn Less, Studies Show, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12 1994, at A1; see also Joy A. Schneer &
Frieda Reitman, Effects of Alternate Family Structures on Managerial Career Paths, 36
ACAD. MGMT. J. 830, 840 (1993) (what was once thought to be a marital bonus paid to
married men is more accurately seen as a “traditional family bonus.” Men whose wives are
home full-time earn more per hour than men whose wives work.).
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Thus, marriage propels men into the paid labor force, even as it offers women a
path out of it.130
Neither men nor women seem particularly upset by this differential response
to marriage. Despite their spending significantly different amounts of time on paid
and unpaid work, married mothers and fathers report “feeling very successful in
balancing work and family life.”131 Married fathers are more likely than married
mothers to report making sacrifices in family time for the sake of their job, but
they are also slightly more likely to report making sacrifices in their job for the
sake of the family.132 It is unmarried mothers who are by far the most likely to
report making sacrifices in both job and family for the sake of the other.133 Married
mothers, who work the fewest paid hours, are the most content with their role
balance.
The gendered differential in time allocation and married parents’ satisfaction
with it does not conform particularly well with what parents say they believe about
a gendered division of work. Of people born between 1965 and 1981, 82% believe
that “both parents should be equally involved in care giving.”134 Putting those
beliefs together with the data on actual hours devoted to caretaking, it is striking
that more parents are not dissatisfied with their role allocation. Also interesting, is
the correlation between belief in gender egalitarianism and gendered work
patterns. Education level is highly correlated with belief in gender equality, as is
income level.135 Yet, the more wealth a married couple has, the more profound
130

Whether the total number of hours that men and women work is equal seems to
depend on how completely they specialize along gender lines. In households where women
perform no paid labor, men, on average, work more hours than women. In households in
which women work outside the home (and do the bulk of unpaid labor), it is the women
who work more hours. BIANCHI ET AL., supra note 118, at 56.
131
BIANCHI ET AL., supra note 118, at 139 (50% of married fathers and 52% of
married mothers report feeling very successful in achieving work/family balance); see also
Alan J. Hawkins et al., The Orientation Toward Domestic Labor Questionnaire: Exploring
Dual-Earner Wives’ Sense of Fairness About Family Work, 12 J. FAM. PSYCHOL. 244, 244
(1998) (“although dual-earner wives [in the United States] do two to three times the
amount of domestic work their husbands do, less than one third of wives report the division
of daily family work as unfair.”).
132
BIANCHI ET AL., supra note 118, at 139 (20% of married men report sacrificing
family time for career, versus only 14% of married women. 32% of married men report
sacrificing job for family, versus 30% for married women.).
133
Id.
134
Id. at 128 fig.7.2.
135
See Richard J. Harris & Juanita M. Firestone, Changes in Predictors of Gender
Role Ideologies Among Women: A Multivariate Analysis, 38 SEX ROLES 239, 240 (1998)
(linking commitment to gender equality and education); Dep’t of Health and Human
Services, Cohabitation,, Marriage, Divorce, and Remarriage in the United States 4 (2002),
available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/sr_23/sr23_022.pdf (linking marriage rate
to education stating, “[i]n addition to race and employment status, other characteristics of
individuals that have been found to be related to a higher probability of getting married
include higher education and earnings.”). Education may teach people to believe in gender
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their gender specialization tends to be.136 What can account for a feeling of success
if one’s behavior so clearly deviates from one’s beliefs about gender equity?
One answer may be capaciousness in the term “equality.” It is not precisely
clear what people mean when they say that both parents should share equally.
Perhaps people mean that the investment in caretaking should be comparable, or
equal-on-major-decision-making, or at least close. Any of those understandings of
equality, though, may muddle claims for SSM. Civil Unions are comparable and
close to marriage. Is that enough?
Another reason people may not be concerned about deviating from their
reported beliefs about gender roles is that they underestimate the importance of
gender in their own lives. Women may feel like they have successfully negotiated
a paid/unpaid balance even though they do twice as much unpaid work as their
spouses because norms of motherhood encourage them to do so much unpaid
work. Interviews with mothers who have left or significantly diminished their paid
work suggest as much. “I have more of a link [to my children] than my husband
does.” “You can’t get away from the fact that women bear children.” “The day-today stuff is harder for men.” “He doesn’t have the same guilt that I have. He
doesn’t worry that it’s going to hurt them.” 137
Men may feel comfortable doing so much less unpaid work in the home
because masculinity norms strongly encourage them to participate in the
workforce. Participating in the workforce allows men to compete, usually with
other men, and competition is a hallmark of masculinity.138 Earning the bulk of the
family’s money also allows men to define themselves as breadwinners and
providers. As numerous scholars of fatherhood and masculinity have concluded,
“the breadwinner role is socially defined as men’s primary family role.”139

equality, but it also enables them to make more money and the more money a couple
makes, the more likely they are to lead gendered lives. See infra note 136.
136
In addition to the figures cited above regarding women who can afford to be at
home full-time, see Wallis, supra note 125, at 53; Ellman, supra note 127, at 459-60,
consider these figures: 22% of women with professional degrees do not work at all so that
they can stay home with their children, see Wallis, supra note 125, at 53, and only 41% of
married mothers with post-graduate education work full-time. Bianchi, supra note 118, at
58. Only 33% of women with post-graduate education and at least one child under age six
work full-time. Id. It is possible that all of these women with professional degrees are
living off of their part-time salaries or accumulated wealth, but it is probably much more
likely that the primary source of income to their household comes from a husband.
137
All of these quotes are taken from women interviewed by Mary Blair-Loy in her
book on women executives. See MARY BLAIR-LOY, COMPETING DEVOTIONS: CAREER AND
FAMILY AMONG WOMEN EXECUTIVES 83-84 (Harvard Univ. Press 2003).
138
ALLEN G. JOHNSON, THE GENDER KNOT: UNRAVELING OUR PATRIARCHAL
LEGACY 34 (1997) (men compete with each other for women and power in society).
139
Joseph H. Pleck, Husbands’ Paid Work and Family Roles: Current Research
Issues, in RESEARCH IN THE INTERWEAVE OF SOCIAL ROLES: JOBS AND FAMILIES 251, 305
(Helena Z. Lopata & Joseph H. Pleck eds., JAI Press, Inc. 1983).
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“[B]readwinning has remained the great unifying element in fathers’ lives. Its
obligations . . . shape their sense of self, manhood and gender.”140
In accounts of why and how many well-educated, formerly egalitarian couples
divided roles along gender lines, participants report that paid work is simply more
psychologically important to fathers than mothers.141 As Steven Nock writes in his
study of how marriage functions in men’s lives, “[a husband] in his role as primary
provider for the family, has committed himself to instrumental tasks that contribute
to his gender identity as a man.”142 “[S]ome amount of differentiation (or
inequality) in marriage contributes to what it means to ‘be’ a husband, and . . .
what it means to conform to cultural ideals of masculinity.”143 If that inequality
within marriage is essential to how marriage provides identity for its participants,
will gay and lesbian couples be able to access comparable notions of identity
through marriage?
The importance of gender roles is evident in the incidence of marriage as
well. Data collected on those who do not marry suggests that marital gender roles
are more robust than marriage itself. Women who are likely to earn equal to or
more than their husbands are much less likely to marry.144 This phenomenon is
most profound at either end of the income scale. Studies of unmarried poor women
indicate that though many of these women want to marry and have turned down
marriage proposals from men, they remain single because they cannot find a
suitable spouse.145 A suitable spouse, for them, would be one who would remain
faithful, stay employed, and provide for the family.146 An unemployed spouse or a
spouse who could not be relied upon, was not worthy of marriage. These women
continue to believe in marriage, but marriage for them is an institution that requires
men to assume certain roles.
High-earning women have a related problem. One study found that for
women between the ages of forty and forty-four, the percentage who have never
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1993).
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BLAIR-LOY, supra note 137, at 68, 72, 84 (“[M]y husband loves his work. For him
to make a change would be change of such magnitude, such importance to him personally .
. . .” “I’m much more apt to be thinking about my kids than I am about work and I think
that’s the difference . . . He’s just more distracted by work . . . .” “He would find it very
difficult [to be the primary parent] . . . He’d be very antsy to get back to work.”); JOAN
WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND WHAT TO DO
ABOUT IT 25-31 (Oxford Univ. Press 2000) (describing how women assume the burden of
unpaid work because it is so important for their spouses to keep working long hours in paid
work).
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NOCK, supra note 97, at 62.
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Id. at 132.
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Ellman, supra note 127, at 458-59.
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KATHRYN EDIN & MARIA KEFALAS, PROMISES I CAN KEEP: WHY POOR WOMEN
PUT MOTHERHOOD BEFORE MARRIAGE 130 (Univ. of Cal. Press 2005).
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Id. at 126, 130.
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married increases with education for every year beyond one year of college.147 This
may be because, like poor women, high-earning women seek men who can
perform the traditional provider role and the more women provide for themselves,
the higher the standard they will set for their prospective spouses. Alternatively, it
may be that men do not want to relinquish the traditional marital role and,
therefore, prefer not to marry women who might earn as much as them. It may be
both. Regardless, the patterns suggest that gender roles continue to play a
prominent role in people’s understanding of what marriage is.
The prevalence of gendered marital roles is often thought to be beyond the
law’s reach. The law—and many people—view the marital relationship as a
private one, entitled to a norm of non-interference.148 An individual couple’s
decision to specialize along gender lines probably feels personal to them and a
function of their unique attributes as a couple, even though if an employer or the
government specialized in that same way it would raise serious equality concerns.
Legal attempts to interfere with a couple’s allocation of marital roles would
probably strike many as impermissibly invasive.
Yet the gender patterns that continue to reproduce themselves in these
seemingly private relationships have indisputable social force. They shape our
understanding of what it means to be a mother and wife or a husband and father.
This is precisely the point that critics of SSM make: by facilitating gender
differentiation, the social institution of marriage helps reify gender roles. Marriage
affords men and women the opportunity to live into separate gender roles in which
both find satisfaction, and through which gender roles are perpetuated.
Even if one thinks that the prevalence of gender roles simply represents
revealed preferences in a situation in which the law is neutral, the current
restrictions on SSM keep marriage gendered. If the expressive and constitutive
benefits of marriage are inexplicably intertwined with the gendered nature of
marriage, and if allowing same-sex couples to marry will undermine that gendered
nature of marriage, then the state’s role cannot be considered neutral with regard to
gender roles. By licensing marriage and restricting it to straight couples, the state
reifies gender. But the state reifies gender precisely because the expressive and
constitutive benefits of marriage are so important to people. In other words, that
which makes marriage a fundamental right may, in and of itself, create a gender
equality problem.
Given that background of what marriage is and how it operates, it is
appropriate to ask what same-sex couples are asking for when they ask for SSM.
Are they claiming that marriage must not be gendered—that the law must interfere
147

Elaina Rose, Education, Hypergamy, and the “Success Gap,” 10 (Univ. of Wash.,
Dep’t of Econ., Working Paper No. 353330, 2006), available at http://www.econ.washing
ton.edu/user/erose/hypergamy_solew.pdf.
148
This norm of non-interference has pedigree in both the common law, see McGuire
v. McGuire, 59 N.W.2d 336, 345 (Neb. 1953) (court will not assume jurisdiction over
parties’ distribution of resources within an ongoing marriage), and the Constitution, see
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 497 (1965) (state cannot interfere with sanctity of
marital decision-making about contraception).
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to prevent the reproduction of traditional gender? Or, are they asking for a right to
enter into an institution that will allow each to assume a gendered role, albeit a
gender role that, for at least one-half of each couple, will not map onto his or her
biological sex? As Part V will show, gender equality doctrine has often been
reticent to eradicate gender roles altogether, particularly when they manifest
themselves in private settings, and it has been quite ambivalent about allowing
people to be alternatively gendered (i.e., to assume a role that does not map onto
his or her biological sex).
IV. EQUALITY DOCTRINE
This Part reviews the law of gender equality in three different contexts:
employment cases involving dress codes, employment cases involving privacy and
sexual preferences, and constitutional cases involving gender discrimination. As a
doctrinal matter, only the constitutional doctrine is relevant. Sanctioning and
licensing some marriages and not others involves quintessential state action. And,
as a constitutional matter, the argument that the state cannot mandate certain
gender roles within marriage seems quite strong.149 But, just as Part IV suggested
that there was cultural ambivalence about what gender equality might mean and
require, the doctrine explored here suggests that there is legal ambivalence over
what gender equality may mean or require.
A. The Grooming Cases
The law of gender equality is most routinely tested and created under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the federal statute that prohibits discrimination
in employment on the basis of sex.150 Within this field, in a set of cases known as
the “dress” or “grooming” cases, employers are allowed to establish separate but
equal rules on the basis of gender and they are allowed to take into account private
biases, i.e., community norms, when hiring and retaining workers. Admittedly, the
permitted accommodation of gender roles is bounded. Employers are not allowed
to segregate job categories (employers cannot channel women into traditionally
female jobs and men into traditionally male jobs);151 nor are they allowed to
exaggerate gender roles in ways that may be detrimental to one sex.152 But, they
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See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text; infra notes 190-193.
See Civil Rights Act of 1964, supra note 124, at §2000a.
151
Though employers are not required to adjust pay across categories if employees’
personal preferences are such that women choose to work in some of the less lucrative,
non-commissioned fields (selling apparel and cosmetics) and men choose to work in the
more lucrative, commissioned fields (selling major items like appliances and furnaces).
EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d 302, 320-21 (7th Cir. 1988).
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Magnuson v. Peak Technical Services Inc. 808 F. Supp. 500, 506 (E.D. Va., 1992)
(denying summary judgment to employer who told employee to wear high heels because
her legs were sexy); Carroll v. Talman Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Chi., 604 F.2d 1028,
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are allowed to impose separate hair length requirements on men and women.153
They can require women, but not men, to wear skirts,154 and men, but not women,
to wear neckties.155 Men are not necessarily entitled to wear effeminate clothing,156
and men can be prohibited from wearing jewelry.157
One of the most recent “grooming” cases involved a bartender who
complained about a company policy that made her wear make-up and cut her hair
in a certain style.158 Her male co-workers were not required to wear make-up or
wear their hair in that style.159 Sitting en banc, the Ninth Circuit wrote, “[t]he
material issue under our settled law is not whether the policies are different, but
whether the policy imposed on the plaintiff creates an unequal burden for [her]
gender.”160 In other words, difference itself does not constitute inequality. Separate
can be equal as long as it is not unduly burdensome.
In a well-publicized grooming case involving a broadcast journalist who was
fired because of declining audience approval numbers attributable to her
appearance, the court wrote that different specific appearance criteria for women
and men “do not implicate the primary thrust of Title VII, which is to prompt
employers to ‘discard outmoded sex stereotypes posing distinct employment
disadvantages for one sex.’”161 The District Court had made clear that there was
nothing wrong with tailoring grooming requirements to conform to “community
standards.”162 In other words, private biases can matter and it is only outmoded
stereotypes that must go.
The grooming cases’ blatant rejection of equality principles that seem core in
the racial context has, not surprisingly, generated a fair amount of commentary.
Some writers feel strongly that the accommodation of gender roles, no matter how
understandable, is pernicious and ultimately undermines what should be the thrust
of equality doctrine. To this group, the manifestation of gender is the problem;
gender distinction and sex discrimination are one in the same thing.163 Mary Anne
1032-33 (7th Cir. 1979) (striking down employer policy that required women to wear
sexually revealing uniform when men could wear street clothes).
153
Dodge v. Giant Food, Inc., 488 F.2d 1333, 1337 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
154
Lanigan v. Bartlett & Co. Grain, 466 F. Supp. 1388, 1391-92 (W.D. Mo. 1979).
155
Devine v. Lonschein, 621 F. Supp. 894, 897 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
156
Doe v. Boeing Co., 846 P.2d 531, 538 (Wash. 1993) (denying claim of a man fired
for wearing “‘excessively’ feminine attire,” including a string of pearls).
157
Lockhart v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp., 795 P.2d 602, 604 (Or. Ct. App. 1990).
158
Jaspersen v. Harrah, 444 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Frank v. United
Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845, 854-55, and Gerdom v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 692 F.2d
602, 605-06).
159
Id.
160
Id. at 1110.
161
Craft v. Metromedia, 766 F.2d 1205, 1215 (8th Cir. 1985) (quoting Knott v. Mo.
Pac. R.R., 527 F.2d 1249, 1251 (8th Cir. 1975)).
162
Craft v. Metromedia, 572 F. Supp. 868, 877 (D.C. Mo. 1983) aff’d in part, rev’d in
part by Craft v. Metromedia, 766 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1985).
163
See Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation:
The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 3 (1995)
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Case argues that “the world will not be safe for women in frilly pink dresses . . .
unless and until it is made safe for men in dresses as well.”164 Taylor Flynn
suggests that employer bans on male employees wearing earrings are nothing more
than penalties on men for failing to conform “to the masculine gender role
expectation that men do not accessorize.”165 Katherine Franke suggests that “Title
VII should recognize the primacy of gender norms as the root of . . . sex
discrimination, and . . . prohibit all forms of normative gender stereotyping . . . .
”166
Others have taken a more accommodating approach. Katharine Bartlett uses
the grooming cases to point out the indeterminacy of the term equality. She writes
“[t]here can be no abstract all-purpose definition of equality that fits all times and
places.”167 Instead she says the focus of equality doctrine should be on whether
gender classifications further gender-based disadvantages and this, she argues,
requires more, not less, attention to community norms (i.e., private biases).168
Robert Post writes that
[i]t is . . . implausible to read Title VII as mandating that gender
conventions be obliterated . . . . [We should not be required] to imagine a
world of sexless individuals, but . . . [should] instead . . . explore the
precise ways in which Title VII should alter the norms by which sex is
given social meaning.169
Kimberly Yuracko suggests that courts use a “power-access approach” that “makes
actionable those, and only those, types of sex-specific trait discrimination that arise
out of gender norms and gender scripts that reinforce sex hierarchy in the
workplace.”170 She goes on to argue that if courts were to prohibit all forms of
gender role distinction and force a convergence “toward an androgynous mean,”
(“We are in danger of substituting for prohibited sex discrimination a still acceptable
gender discrimination . . . .”).
164
Id. at 7-8.
165
Taylor Flynn, Transforming the Debate: Why We Need to Include Transgender
Rights in the Struggles for Sex and Sexual Orientation Equality, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 392,
401 (2001).
166
Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The
Disaggregation of Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 95 (1995).
167
Katharine T. Bartlett, Only Girls Wear Barrettes: Dress and Appearance
Standards, Community Norms and Workplace Discrimination, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2541,
2579 (1994).
168
Id. at 2545 (“Because what constitutes disadvantage, as well as what it takes to
reduce that disadvantage and even what reducing that disadvantage means, can only be
determined in context . . . I conclude that the evaluation of equality claims under Title VII
requires more, not less, attention to community norms.”).
169
Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances, The Logic of American Antidiscrimination
Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1, 20 (2000) (emphasis added).
170
Kimberly A. Yuracko, Trait Discrimination as Sex Discrimination: An Argument
Against Neutrality, 83 TEX. L. REV. 167, 172 (2004).
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women would likely be disadvantaged because they would be forced into a male
norm that would inhibit their freedom without materially increasing anyone
else’s.171
Gendered dress codes serve no other purpose than to accommodate social
norms, that is, private biases, and thereby reify and reproduce gender. If, as the
current law and numerous commentators seem to suggest, dress codes do not
necessarily offend equality principles, some institutional reification of gender must
be permissible. Perhaps marriage serves a comparable purpose.
To be sure, there is Title VII jurisprudence that seems to cabin the grooming
cases. In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins172 the Supreme Court suggested that Title
VII prohibited all sex stereotyping by employers.173 The plaintiff in that case, Mary
Ann Hopkins, was denied partnership at a prestigious accounting firm because, the
trial court found, partners at the firm disapproved of her masculine behavior.174
It seems unlikely that in protecting Mary Ann Hopkins’ right to mimic the
aggressive style of the men who had made partner at Price-Waterhouse, the
Supreme Court meant to rid the workplace of all manifestations of gender
conformity.175 The Ninth Circuit, in Jesperson v. Harrah,176 found reasonable
171

Id. at 202-03.

The employer who does not want to employ men in bob haircuts will simply not
make this an option under its dress code, even if it does not mind women
wearing them. The result is not more options for men to gender bend but fewer
traditionally gender-conforming options for women.
Consider also the case of Shannon Faulkner, who did not want to get a buzz cut when
she entered The Citadel precisely because the deleterious effects of getting a buzz cut
would be much greater on her (given socially accepted gender roles) than it would be on
men. See Valorie K. Vojdik, Gender Outlaws: Challenging Masculinity in Traditionally
Male Institutions, 17 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 68, 70-71 (2002) At a preliminary
injunction hearing, the district court refused to enjoin the buzz cut and Faulkner got one,
shortly before she withdrew from The Citadel because the harassment she received once
there was overwhelming. See id. Presumably, the gender-role eliminators, see supra notes
163-166, would approve of the district court’s decision, but others, see supra notes 167170, might want a more nuanced approach.
172
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074, as recognized in Stender v.
Lucky Stores, Inc., 780 F.Supp. 1302 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
173
“We are beyond the day when an employer can evaluate employees by assuming
or insisting they match the stereotypes associated with their group.” Price Waterhouse,
490 U.S. at 251.
174
For a more detailed description of the Price Waterhouse case, see Yuracko, supra
note 170, at 180.
175
Id. at 171, 188-202 (suggesting that Price Waterhouse is better thought of “as an
articulation of a trait equality requirement” and going on to explore the problems with a
trait equality approach).
176
Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., Inc., 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006). For a
discussion of this case, see supra text accompanying notes 158-160.
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gendered grooming requirements to be consistent with Price-Waterhouse.177 The
problem in Price-Waterhouse, according to the Ninth Circuit, was that gender
conformity would have undermined Mary Ann Hopkins’ attempt to make
partner.178 In contrast, wearing make-up would not have interfered with Darlene
Jesperson’s ability to bartend.179
The Sixth Circuit in Smith v. City of Salem,180 a case involving a male-tofemale transsexual, seems to have reasoned differently, stating “discrimination
against a plaintiff who is transsexual—and therefore fails to act and/or identify
with his or her gender—is no different from discrimination directed against Mary
Ann Hopkins.”181 The full meaning of Smith is indeterminate though. Smith’s
superiors attempted to fire him only after they learned of his intention to complete
a male to female physical transformation. It may have been his intention to actually
become a woman, not stay a man who tended to act in a feminine manner, that
triggered the employment action. 182 And there is something deeply ironic about
prohibiting employers from demanding some conformity to gender stereotypes in
the name of protecting a plaintiff who desperately wanted to conform to a gender
stereotype—albeit one different than the one society had originally assigned to
him.
As scholar Anna Kirkland observes after discussing these cases “gender
stereotyping as a legal idea lives quite comfortably with inconsistency.”183 The
simple point to be emphasized in the SSM context is that anti-discrimination law,
as articulated in Title VII jurisprudence, sends mixed messages about the extent to
which the law is willing to condone gender stereotypes and mandatory gender
conformity.
B. Privacy and Sex
The other contexts in which Title VII condones gender distinctions have to do
with customer preferences that are explicitly linked to customer privacy concerns
or sexual preferences. Thus, nursing homes, hospital delivery room nursing staff,
and agencies that hire nursing aides or others who are likely to have physical
contact with clients (or see them nude), can discriminate on the basis of sex.184 In
177

Id. at 1109-11.
Id. at 1110.
179
Id.
180
Smith v. City of Salem, Ohio, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004).
181
Id. at 575.
182
Management may have simply been prejudiced against transsexuals. Id. at 569.
183
ANNA KIRKLAND, FAT RIGHTS: DILEMMAS OF DIFFERENCE AND PERSONHOOD 89
(N.Y. Univ. Press 2008).
184
See, e.g., Healey v. Southwood Psychiatric Hosp., 78 F.3d 128, 133 (3d Cir. 1996)
(permitting sex to be a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) for psychiatric hospital
staff treating emotionally disturbed and sexually abused children and adolescents, noting
that because “[c]hild patients often [had to be] accompanied to the bathroom, and
sometimes . . . bathed”); Jones v. Hinds Gen. Hosp., 666 F. Supp. 933, 935 (S.D. Miss.
178
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explaining these cases, Robert Post suggests that courts may take sex into
consideration, especially in some contexts, because “[g]ender is highly salient in
matters of privacy. The sex of the person by whom we are seen or touched
normally matters very much to us.”185 Whatever our commitments to gender
equality, they do not necessarily trump the values we place on protecting personal
privacy preferences.186
Commentators and courts have also suggested that jobs can be segregated on
the basis of sex when sexual titillation goes to the essence of the service provided,
be it burlesque, lap dancing or Playboy Bunny service.187 Courts are less willing to
suspend equality principles in the sexual titillation context than in the privacy
context, but the more explicitly sexual the business, the more acceptable the sex
discrimination. Most commentators concede that being a woman is a bona fide
occupational qualification (BFOQ) for working in a strip club, at least one that
caters to men.188
Two things are worth noting about the privacy and sexual titillation cases.
First, in neither context would the racial preferences of consumers be allowed to
trump. No one suggests that an obstetric patient could request a white nurse over
an African-American nurse, even though she can request a female nurse over a

1987) (The job duties of male and female nurse assistants and male orderlies often require
that such employee view or touch the private parts of their patients.); Fesel v. Masonic
Home of Del., Inc., 447 F. Supp. 1346, 1352-53 (D.C. Del. 1978) (“The Home has the
responsibility of providing twenty-four hour supervision and care of its elderly guests.
Fulfillment of that responsibility necessitates intimate personal care including dressing,
bathing, toilet assistance, geriatric pad changes and catheter care. Each of these functions
involves a personal touching . . . .”). But see Olsen v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d
1052, 1068 (D. Ariz. 1999) (finding against using gender as a BFOQ for a massage
therapist position).
185
Post, supra note 169, at 26.
186
Alhough, Kimberly Yuracko points out that allowing privacy concerns to trump
equality principles in the privacy cases in not likely to have a disparate impact on one
particular sex. Kimberly A. Yuracko, Private Nurses and Playboy Bunnies: Explaining
Permissible Sex Discrimination, 92 CAL. L. REV. 147, 181 (2004). “[W]hile women may
be denied certain jobs to protect men’s privacy, men will be denied the same range of jobs
to protect women’s privacy.” Id.
187
See ARTHUR LARSON & LEX K. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION §
43.02(2) (1992) (citing burlesque, go-go dancers and chorus line kicker as jobs for which
authenticity requires distinguishing on the basis of sex). Although changing norms in the
last thirty years have made Playboy Clubs all but obsolete, when Title VII first passed,
New York administrative commissions found it permissible for the Clubs to discriminate in
hiring Bunnies. St. Cross v. Playboy Club, Case No. CSF 22618-70, Appeal No. 773 (N.Y.
Hum. Rts. Appeal Board Dec. 17, 1971); Weber v. Playboy Club, Case No. CSF 22619-70,
Appeal No. 774 (N.Y. Hum. Rts. Appeal Board Dec. 17, 1971).
188
Title VII allows discrimination in cases where being a particular sex is considered
a necessary part of the job. See Larry Alexander, What Makes Wrongful Discrimination
Wrong? Biases, Preferences, Stereotypes, and Proxies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 205-06
(1992) (citing LARSON & LARSON, supra note 187, at § 15.10) (discussing strip clubs).
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male one. Comparably, the Hefner organization would not be allowed to
discriminate on the basis of race in hiring Playboy Bunnies. Second, recall that this
is an article about marriage. Whatever else marriage is, it is an institution that
people strongly associate with privacy and sex, yet those are areas in which the
doctrine suggests that equality interests may be trumped.
C. Constitutional Gender Equality
As suggested above, notwithstanding the Title VII jurisprudence
accommodating gender roles, the Supreme Court has repeatedly struck down as
unconstitutional sex-based classifications that were rooted in provider/caretaker
stereotypes. The armed services cannot assume that wives of service men are
dependent on their spouses if they do not make the same assumption about
husbands of service women.189 The Social Security Administration cannot
differentiate between widows and widowers when awarding survivor benefits.190
All statutes authorizing courts to order alimony or spousal maintenance payments
must be sex neutral.191 States cannot distinguish between male and female
children’s entitlement to child support.192
Not that long after these cases were decided, Professor Wendy Williams
suggested that the Supreme Court struck down so many of these sex-based
distinctions so quickly in the 1970s because it “recognize[d] that the real world
outside the courtroom had already changed. Women were in fact no longer chiefly
housewife-dependents. The family wage no longer existed . . . .”193 Williams was
certainly right that the real world had changed by the early 1970s, but that change,
to the extent it has continued, has not resulted in the elimination or gender roles.
Women may not be as dependent on men as they were in 1965, but as a relative
matter, most married women are still dependent on their husbands. The marital
home may not produce the same gender roles as it did in 1965, but the sociological
data strongly suggest that it still produces gender. And, importantly, many men and
women are content with the way in which marriage does so.
If the Supreme Court were to look at the real world now and realize that
gender roles have proved so remarkably resilient, would that be relevant
constitutionally? Would marriage’s role in reifying gender roles require a
degendering of marriage or an acceptance of its gendered nature? The
constitutional jurisprudence regarding sex-based classifications in other areas does
not necessarily render a clear answer.
189

See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 679 (1973).
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 639 (1975); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430
U.S. 199, 202 (1977).
191
Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 281 (1979).
192
Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 8 (1975).
193
Williams, supra note 17, at 155 (citing U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Bureau of Labor
Statistics News 1 (Nov. 15, 1981)). (Williams’ article was published in 1992, but she
started working on it in 1982, a date closer to when the sex discrimination cases were
decided than to the present.).
190
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First, the initial question that the Supreme Court asks when it is addressing
questions of whether a certain statute or policy violates the Constitution’s
prohibition on sex discrimination is whether men and women are similarly
situated. The Equal Protection Clause requires that men and women be treated
comparably only if they are similarly situated.194 Sometimes they are not. Rules
that assign citizenship differently based on whether it is a foreign-born child’s
mother or father who is a United States citizen do not violate the Equal Protection
clause because mothers and fathers are not similarly situated with regard to
parenthood of newborns.195 Comparably, states are allowed to have gendered rules
with regard to relinquishing one’s parental rights (usually in the context of
adoption) because, unless fathers have developed a relationship with their children,
they are not similarly situated to mothers, who have a relationship by virtue of
pregnancy.196 Thus, the constitutional question for SSM may be whether same-sex
couples are similarly situated to opposite-sex couples. If one of the primary
purposes of marriage is to help produce and reify gender identity, then same-sex
couples are not similarly situated to opposite-sex couples with regard to marriage.
Indeed, the existence of SSM may undermine the purpose of marriage by making
gender role construction more a matter of personal choice than socially accepted
norms.
In other contexts, the Supreme Court has suggested (as did some of the courts
in the grooming cases) that gender discrimination is constitutional as long as it is
not the result of rank, non-contemplative stereotyping. Thus, in Rostker v.
Goldberg, the Court upheld a compulsory draft registration system for men
because “Congress did not act ‘unthinkingly’ or ‘reflexively’ . . . .”197 “[T]he
decision to exempt women from registration was not the “accidental by-product of
a traditional way of thinking about females.”198 “The question of registering
women for the draft . . . received considerable national attention and was the
subject of wide-ranging public debate . . . .”199 Comparably, whatever the origins
of prohibitions on SSM (which may well have been reflexive and unthinking), gay
194

See Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975) (longer periods for
promotion acceptable for women because men and women were “not similarly situated
with respect to opportunities for professional service.”).
195
Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 54 (2001) (son of Vietnamese mother and American
father not a citizen even though son of Vietnamese father and American mother would be).
196
Cf. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 392 (1979) (biological father could block
adoption of child by mother’s husband because biological father and mother had shared
parenting duties once the children are born), with Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 250
(1983) (biological father of child could not block the adoption by mother’s husband
because biological father had not developed a relationship with child).
197
Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 72 (1981); see also Craft v. Metromedia, 766
F.2d 1205, 1216 (8th Cir. 1985) (suggesting Title VII’s primary thrust was only to
“discard outmoded sex stereotypes”) (emphasis added) (quoting Knott v. Mo. Pac. R.R.,
527 F.2d 1249, 1251 (8th Cir. 1975).
198
Rostker, 453 U.S. at 74 (quoting Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 320 (1977)).
199
Id. at 72.
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marriage has now been the subject of wide-ranging political dialogue. Few states
that continue to ban SSM are doing so as an “accidental by-product of traditional
ways” of thinking about marriage. They are doing so in the midst of a vigorous
debate about what marriage means.200 Most of the states that prohibit SSM have
had recent referenda on the issue.201 If the social meaning of marriage is contested
in an open and deliberative way, then a discrimination doctrine aimed at
prohibiting reflexive stereotypes may not require that marriage be defined in one
way or another.
Ironically, while those states that have had referenda on SSM may shield
themselves from claims of non-contemplative stereotyping, they open themselves
up to claims of animus against gays and lesbians. The recent attempts to codify
marriage as heterosexual were born in a movement in which open antipathy to
gays and lesbians was commonplace.202
A finding of animus makes the analogy to race more salient, thus bolstering
the claim that separate cannot be equal and the level of scrutiny a court is likely to
use in evaluating marriage statutes. Still, given how scholarship has argued that
discrimination against gays and lesbians is sex discrimination,203 and given the
lack of animus in Story #6, one would expect courts to exert more effort in
explaining why race and not sex discrimination doctrine should control. As
Professor Stephen Clark has succinctly summarized, “classifications based on sex
are not inherently suspect . . . .”204 Classifications based on race are. To the extent
that the Supreme Courts in Iowa, Connecticut and California are saying that
classifications based on sexual orientation are inherently suspect, one would think
they would need to explain why discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is
more like race discrimination than sex discrimination.
The strongest and most helpful gender discrimination case for SSM advocates
is United States v. Virginia205 (“VMI”). In that case, the Supreme Court ruled that
the Virginia Military Institute’s interest in keeping an environment in which
“[p]hysical rigor, mental stress, absolute equality of treatment, [and] absence of
privacy . . .” were stressed—an environment that was much easier to maintain with
an all-male population—could not justify excluding women.206 The Court ruled

200

See Human Rights Campaign, Statewide Marriage Prohibitions, http://www.hrc.
org/documents/marriage_prohibitions.pdf (last visited Nov. 17, 2008) (map of the U.S.
showing which states have a constitutional amendment, or a state law limiting marriage to
one man and one woman).
201
See id.
202
See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
203
See supra note 16 (articles suggesting that discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation is sex discrimination).
204
Stephen Clark, Same-Sex but Equal: Reformulating the Miscegenation Analogy, 34
RUTGERS L.J. 107, 165 (2002).
205
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
206
Id. at 522.
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that the state must proffer an “exceedingly persuasive justification” for excluding
women from this bastion of masculinity.207 Virginia could not meet this burden.
Under one reading of VMI, the Supreme Court held that the Equal Protection
Clause ensured women access to state-sponsored environments that promote and
reify masculinity. Under this reading, same-sex couples should be entitled to enter
into the institution of marriage because those couples have a right to access statesponsored environments that promote gender roles even if those roles do not map
onto a particular person’s biological sex. What this account fails to consider
though is how readily the Supreme Court conceded that equality principles
required nothing more than separate but equal accommodations.
The acceptance of separate but equal standards is most obvious in the
discussion that occupied most of the VMI Court’s opinion, to wit, whether the
alternative program that Virginia had made available to women interested in a
military-like education provided equal opportunity. In response to early losses in
the litigation, Virginia had developed a program—Virginia Women’s Institute for
Leadership (“VWIL”)—at Mary Baldwin College, which offered an all-female
option for women who wanted a militaristic experience.
Justice Ginsburg’s opinion details how VWIL did not offer anywhere near as
rigorous military training as VMI did. The women students did not need to “live
together . . . eat meals together . . .,” or experience the “spartan living
arrangements designed to foster an ‘egalitarian ethic’”208 Moreover, Mary Baldwin
College had vastly inferior sports facilities, a faculty that held “significantly fewer
Ph.D.s, and receive[d] substantially lower salaries,” and “no courses in engineering
or . . . advanced math and physics . . . .”209 In short, the Court readily found that
separate was not equal because the separate schools were funded and supported at
completely different levels.210
The Court’s discussion in VMI is distinctly different than the Court’s
discussion forty-two years earlier in Brown v. Board of Education. In Brown the
Court wrote “there are findings below that the Negro and white schools involved
have been equalized, or are being equalized with respect to . . . ‘tangible’ factors.
Our decision, therefore, cannot turn on merely a comparison of these tangible
factors . . . .”211 Instead, the court focused on the “hearts and minds” of the
African-American children and on the psychological harm they were likely to
suffer because “[t]o separate them . . . solely because of their race generates a
feeling of inferiority.”212
Separating genders is not usually so interpreted. Unisex bathrooms are rarer
than gendered ones. Neither women nor men walk through a department store
207

Id. at 524.
Id. at 548 (quoting United States v. Commonwealth, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1424
(W.D. Va. 1991)).
209
Id. at 551-52.
210
Id.
211
Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 492 (1954) (citing Brown v. Bd.
of Educ. of Topeka, 98 F. Supp. 797, 798 (D.C. Kan. 1951)).
212
Id.
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feeling inferior because women’s clothes are in one place and the men’s clothes in
another.213 In VMI, the Supreme Court gave no indication that the VWIL option
was inherently unequal because it was separate.214 If a fully funded, adequately
staffed Mary Baldwin College facility would have passed constitutional muster,
then VMI cannot be read to hold that women are necessarily entitled to be
alternatively gendered.215
There are further indications of slippery notions of equality in VMI. When
explaining that VMI was obligated to open its programs to women the Court
dropped a curious footnote: “admitting women to VMI would undoubtedly require
alterations necessary to afford members of each sex privacy from the other in
living arrangements, and to adjust aspects of physical training programs.”216 Why
would equality doctrine undoubtedly require this? Shouldn’t equality doctrine
prevent such an accommodation? Is this another example of privacy trumping
equality? Presumably, the Court was concerned about women’s safety,217 but that
concern leads one to conclude that equality requires protecting women from
violent masculinity even as equality entitles women to it. 218
213

The degree of outrage stemming from gender distinction appears to be contextual.
Many people are upset when children’s toy stores segregate toys on the basis of gender
even if they are not upset by the segregation of adult apparel. Perhaps this is because
people recognize that adult women and adult men have “real” physical differences that
necessitate different clothing styles, while boy and girl children are thought to have fewer
“real” differences. But undoubtedly, the difference in style between men and women’s
clothing vastly exceeds any “real” difference in body type and many, many parents watch
in amazement as boy and girl children seem to demonstrate “real” differences.
214
See Clark, supra note 204, at 166-67 (“[S]ex equality law has no analogue to
Brown v. Board of Education or any parallel proposition that merely drawing a sex-based
line is inherently unequal or necessarily stamps one sex or the other with a badge of
inferiority.”).
215
Chief Justice Rehnquist concurred separately to show his support for single-sex
education and to demonstrate that Virginia could solve the dilemma by providing a fully
comparable facility for women. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 564-66
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). Apparently, Chief Judge Rehnquist was unsure whether the
majority would ever accept a separate but equal facility. But the majority spends most of its
analysis demonstrating how the separate facility is inferior, not explaining—as the Brown
court did—why a separate facility must be inferior.
216
Id. at 550, n.19.
217
The level of sexual assault and harassment at some military academies has proven
to be astounding. See Vojdik, supra note 171, at 101-02.
218
It is worth noting that the masculinity usually reified at military academies is very
different than the masculinity that marriage is supposed to produce. Indeed, believers in the
inherently gendered nature of marriage might argue that marriage is necessary precisely
because it provides for men a much more caring, cooperative and responsible masculine
template. Military academies are infamous for their misogynistic norms. Pursuant to those
norms, women are seen as weak; if men are to interact with them at all it is to abuse or rape
them. See Vojdik, supra note 171, at 68-69.
Modern marriage suggests something very different about male and female
interactions. According to the gender norms of marriage, men and women are different but
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A rich conception of gender equality can reconcile the apparent contradiction
of women being entitled to both protection from and access to masculinity norms.
Arguably, women must be granted entrance to those institutions that have afforded
men power precisely because men have gained that power at women’s expense.
The process of integration into those institutions will be dangerous and difficult.
Therefore, women must be protected from private individuals who will seek to
thwart their access to power. Women’s access to power is what equality doctrine
protects.
This richer conception of equality is not necessarily applicable in the SSM
context. What is it that equality doctrine will protect for same-sex couples? Is it the
right to be alternatively gendered or the right to degender marriage? The benefits
that opposite-sex couples gain in marriage have not necessarily come at same-sex
couples’ expense. For sure, as the California Supreme Court recognized, there is a
respect and dignity that accompanies most opposite-sex marriages and same-sex
couples have been denied that respect and dignity, but so has everyone who does
not get married. Many marriage critics have argued that the respect and dignity that
accompanies married people has come mostly at the expense of single people.219
The accolades that accompany marriage may also be a function of the social
praise that accompanies living into one’s socially programmed gender identity.
Marriage is much more about the absence of choice than the exercise of it. The
purpose of opposite-sex marriage may be to make good men and women, with
responsible masculine and feminine characteristics. This is only possible
(according to Story #6) if the individuals are not free to choose their own gender
identity. Entering marriage is seen as a rite of passage because it involves
accepting the more restrictive world of roles. Living within those roles is
celebrated as a sign of maturity.

that difference is to be respected. One’s job is to love the other, not denigrate it. One’s
responsibility is to care for and nurture the other and to let the other care for and nurture
you. In historical context, or in the context of a broad understanding of how gender reflects
power, gendered marriage may just be misogyny more pleasingly dressed up as a separatebut-equal regime, but many people would reject the idea of gendered marriage as
misogynistic, even while accepting that the masculinity of the military academies is
misogynistic. Those social understandings of gender roles and how they operate may
matter in political and legal discussions of who is entitled to marriage and why. For many,
gendered marriage offers a non-misogynistic alternative for masculine identity and
therefore gendered marriage has tremendous social value. And, equality doctrine
(sometimes) suggests that as long as gender norms are benign, they are acceptable.
219
See Rachel F. Moran, How Second-Wave Feminist Feminism Forgot the Single
Woman, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 223 passim (2004) (exploring the advantages of non-married
life and questioning why the law should support marriage); Laura Rosenbury, Friends with
Benefits?, 106 MICH. L. REV. 189, passim (2007) (exploring how “friends might serve
many of the functions that the law reserves for family.”); Katherine M. Franke, Sexuality
and Marriage: The Politcs of Same-Sex Marriage Politics, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 236,
244-45 (2006) (criticizing the “lesbigay” movements’ adoption of marriage norms at the
expense of celebrating sexuality unbound by marriage).
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In his very thoughtful explication of the miscegenation analogy in the SSM
context, Stephen Clark argues that because Brown has no analogue in sex
discrimination doctrine,220 the determination of whether SSM restrictions are sex
discrimination must be based on pre-Brown discrimination doctrine, particularly
Sweatt v. Painter,221 from which the majority quoted liberally in VMI.222 The
operative question that emerges from the pre-Brown era is whether a classification
affords different groups “substantially equal” opportunities.223 Clark concludes that
SSM bans and even civil union options do not afford gay individuals substantially
equal opportunities.
Critical to Clark’s analysis is his observation that equal protection rights are
“personal rights” that ensure that individuals must be entitled to opportunities that
are substantially equal to the opportunities that other individuals (of different races
or sexes) enjoy.224 But in the marriage context, they are individual rights to a legal
status that gets much of its import and significance, and therefore, much of its
constitutional stature, from social norms. If, given the gendered nature of modern
marriage, marriages between same-sex partners will not be experienced as
substantially equal or the same as marriages between opposite-sex partners, does
that mean that same-sex couples do not have a right to them? Are same-sex
couples even asking for a right to the same institution? Once again, the legal
analysis of the SSM question depends on the story one tells about marriage.
Whether consciously or not, the reason the courts of California, Connecticut
and Iowa may have latched onto race, not sex, discrimination doctrine is that there
is much less ambivalence about the meaning of equality in the race context.
Separate is not equal when it comes to race and the law does not accommodate
racist biases. If prohibiting SSM is discrimination against gays and lesbians
because they are gays and lesbians, and sexual orientation is a suspect
classification like race, then courts can avoid the ambivalent nature of sex equality
doctrine and at least elide the hard task of defining marriage. Still, given the wellknown argument that sexual orientation discrimination is sex discrimination225
given how central gender has always been to marriage, and given how a gendered
understanding of marriage undermines the applicability of the racial analogy, it is a
bit surprising that the predominant analogy has been to race. At a minimum, one
would expect courts to explain why the more accommodating approach to gender
discrimination should not be adopted in equality discussions of SSM.
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See Clark, supra note 204, at 165 (“[c]lassifications based on sex are not
inherently suspect.”).
221
See Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
222
Clark, supra note 204, at 173-74.
223
Id. at 174.
224
Clark, supra note 204, at 178-79 (citing Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948)).
225
See sources cited, supra note 16.
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D. The Law of Marriage
Finally, a note on the irony of using equality doctrine to secure rights to
marriage. Much of the law of marriage, and particularly the law of marriage
dissolution exists because gender roles exist. Arguably, the reason marital property
regimes assume that all income and property earned during the marriage should be
split equally, and the reason spousal maintenance regimes require one spouse to
support the other after the marriage is over, is because of the strong likelihood that
spouses will be dissimilarly situated. The law of marital dissolution is designed to
treat “unalikes alike.”226 The more similarly situated the spouses are, the less we
need a law of marital dissolution.
Few people advocate dispensing with marital property or maintenance rules.
Treating unalikes as comparably entitled at the end of a marriage strikes most
people as justified, necessary, and fair, but it has little to do with traditional
equality doctrine.227 This does not preclude plaintiffs from making equality claims
to enter the institution,228 but it does shed light on how and why equality arguments
may seem inapt.
What is it that SSM couples are being deprived of if the purpose of marriage
is to make sure that women get compensated for the unpaid work that they do, and
that men retain responsibilities for the dependencies they have enabled? Won’t
most same-sex couples look much more similarly situated than most husbands and
wives, and might that realization undermine the family law rules that have
protected women because they are not similarly situated? The modern trend—even
in non-community property states—to distribute property equally at divorce and
the modern defense of spousal maintenance almost always makes explicit
reference to the need to protect women.229 Will the arguments for joint property
and spousal maintenance seem as compelling if the dependent role is chosen in
226

Aristotle famously described equality as treating likes alike and unalikes unalike.
See ARISTOTLE, ETHICA NICOMACHEA v. 3 1121a-1131b, 113 (J.L. Ackrill & J.O. Urmson
eds & W. Ross trans., 1980) (“this is the origin of quarrels and complaints – when either
equals have and are awarded unequal shares, or unequals equal shares.”) For more
discussion of Aristotle’s influence on the law of gender equality, see CATHARINE
MACKINNON, SEX EQUALITY 4-10 (2001).
227
See June Carbone, The Futility of Coherence: The ALI’s Principles of the Law of
Family Dissolution, Compensatory Spousal Payments, 4 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 43, 78 (2002);
Ann Laquer Estin, Maintenance, Alimony and the Rehabilitation of Family Care, 71 N.C.
L. REV. 721 passim (1993); Joan Williams, Is Coverture Dead, Beyond a New Theory of
Alimony, 82 GEO. L.J. 2227 passim (1994); Jana Singer, Divorce Reform and Gender
Justice, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1103 passim (1989) (all arguing that maintenance is necessary as a
way of compensating women for their unpaid family work).
228
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967), the case in which the Supreme Court
struck down miscegenation laws is an example of when an equality claim could be made in
a way that would have no bearing on the law of marital dissolution.
229
See sources cited, supra note 227.
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defiance of social norms instead of in compliance with them? Will we need more
proof from gay couples than we do from straight ones that their marital roles were
explicitly negotiated such that one person promised to provide and the other
promised to do more unpaid work? Or, will we assume that it is marriage, not
gender, that leads to role specialization? Why, after all, should the law condone
marital roles given their tendency to leave so many people so vulnerable?
Infusing equality principles into the law of marriage leads to a host of these
disruptive questions. People eager to understand what marriage is, how it
functions, and whether it is worth the acclaim it receives may welcome these
questions, but proponents of SSM cannot realistically assert that the questions are
not disruptive. Sorting through the answers to these questions might well change
marriage as we know it.
V. ANOTHER STORY
Story #6 accurately describes the way marriage functions in many married
people’s lives. But it need not represent a marital ideal and its descriptive accuracy
does not preclude people from believing that the essence of marriage is about
something other than its gendering function. Marriage may be a gender factory, but
it does not have to be. And, if a competing story of marriage can emerge as
dominant, the descriptive accuracy of Story #6 becomes less important.
In this last Part, I offer another story of marriage, one that incorporates
aspects of many of the previous marriage narratives, one that can be reconciled
with the doctrine that suggests that marriage is a fundamental right, yet one that
would compel states to license SSM. However, it is a discourse that challenges
many modern understandings of what marriage should be.
A. Story #7
Marriage marks the creation of a legal family. That family serves as a critical
source of identity for its members. The law assumes and facilitates both material
and emotional interdependence within that family in order to make it more stable
and efficient. Material interdependence arises from the roles that are assumed
when the parties specialize in different kinds of marital contributions, and from the
reliance that develops over time in a relationship marked by sharing. Emotional
interdependence—which usually includes a sexual relationship—arises from the
sense of connection that leads the parties to want to marry. One of the main
purposes of marriage is to raise children.
1. Marriage as a Fundamental Right and an Equality Right
If Story #7 describes marriage, gays and lesbians should have a right to it both
because marriage is a fundamental right and because gays and lesbians are
similarly situated to straight couples with regard to marriage. Just as Story #1
suggested, the state has an interest in defining and maintaining the legal institution
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of marriage because of the way in which legal marriage promotes stability and
efficiency. The state facilitates marital interdependence by providing the rights and
obligations that bind the parties to each other and enable marital role development.
As various courts and legislatures have found, there is no good reason to deny
same-sex couples access to these rights and obligations.230
As Story #2 suggested, because of the role marriage plays in shaping peoples’
identities and because of the expressive and constitutive benefits that flow from
marriage, marriage cannot be viewed as only this bundle of rights and obligations.
It is a lasting social institution, accompanied by a rich set of norms and
expectations that both restrict and enrich its participants. These restrictions and
expectations have traditionally included, but need not include gender role
conformity. The enrichment that marriage provides does not need to come from
living into a responsible masculinity or femininity (Story #6), but can come from
living into a responsible role as spouse.
As with the traditional masculine and feminine roles, the role of spouse
requires a relinquishment of self, a doing for others, and a conformity with external
norms that involves subjugating autonomy and self-interest. 231 But also, as with
the traditional masculine and feminine roles, fulfilling the role of spouse allows for
transcendence of self and a realization of a new identity.232 Thus, marriage
involves a kind of self-realization that stems from connection, not gender.233
Through this connection, which is re-inforced by both social and legal norms,
married people become something new. If the state is to deny people the ability to
tap into this rich set of norms in order to express and constitute themselves through
230

See Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864, 911 (Vt. 1999); Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d
196 218 (N.J. 2006), (requiring the states to provide Civil Union status to gay and lesbian
couples). The state legislatures of New Hampshire, Connecticut, and California have also
granted Civil Union status based on this reasoning. See Lambda Legal, Status of Same-Sex
Relationships Nationwide, Oct. 5, 2009, http://lambdalegal.org/nationwide-status-samesex-relationships.html, providing a summary of state legislation giving same-sex couples
relationship status.
231
See Regan, supra note 101, at 2088-89, and Bartlett, supra note 101, at 301
(discussing the ways in which accepting the responsibility of certain roles can be a sign of
growth and ennoblement.).
232
As Milton Regan writes, “spouses . . . don’t simply help each other construct
separate individual identities . . . [T]hey participate in the creation of a shared identity.”
MILTON C. REGAN, JR., FAMILY LAW AND THE PURSUIT OF INTIMACY 94 (1993); see also
Kenneth Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 636 (1980) (“our
intimate associations are powerful influences over the development of our personalities.”);
GEORGE P. FLETCHER, LOYALTY: AN ESSAY ON THE MORALITY OF RELATIONSHIPS 81
(1993) (discussing loyalty to one’s spouse as an instance where the self and other blend
together).
233
Objections relations theory has long taught us that human beings have very strong
desires for strong emotional attachments. “People are constructed in such a fashion that
they are inevitably and powerfully drawn together . . . wired for intense and persistent
involvements with one another.” STEPHEN A. MITCHELL, RELATIONAL CONCEPTS IN
PSYCHOANALYSIS: AN INTEGRATION 21 (Harvard Univ. Press 1988).
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marriage, it must have a very good reason. This is why marriage is a fundamental
right.
The legal rights and obligations that accompany marriage facilitate
interdependence and commitment, but they do not define the social meaning of
spouse. That social meaning comes from the social norms that accompany statesponsored marriage. Civil Unions or Domestic Partnership may not trigger the
same set of norms and, thus, they may not demand of their participants the same
kinds of commitments.234 The problem is not that separate or different cannot be
equal, but that alternative marriage forms are likely to be materially different
because of the different social norms that will accompany them. It is those social
norms that make marriage a fundamental right because they are what give marriage
its expressive and constitutive qualities.
In order for same-sex couples to be entitled to that fundamental right, the
social meaning of marriage must have more to do with being a spouse, than being a
husband or wife. If marriage is about making two spouses, not making a husband
and wife, same-sex and straight couples are similarly situated with regard to their
ability to achieve that spousal status. Therefore, same-sex couples have an equality
right to marriage.
2. Marriage and Children
Marriage also often produces children. It can produce them by having one of
the spouse’s get pregnant; it can produce them by adopting them; it can produce
them by entering into some form of reproductive technology contract. My use of
the impersonal pronoun here is deliberate. The law used to think of marriage itself
as producing children. Custody jurisdiction at divorce extended to “children of the
marriage.” 235 Courts in intestacy proceedings routinely referred to “children of the
marriage.”236 Today, we tend to think of parents and spouses separately.
Individuals produce children; marriages do not. But marriage retains more
importance as an institution when the law gives it credit for producing children and
same-sex parents have much to gain in giving that credit to marriage.
The opponents of SSM are surely right in Stories #4 and #5 when they say
that children have something to do with marriage. For many people, the desire for
children probably motivates the decision to marry. And that makes sense. It may
234

Elizabeth Scott, A World Without Marriage, 41 FAM. L.Q. 537, 537 (2007)
(questioning whether the social norms and expectations for marriage—commitment,
fidelity, full emotional intimacy—will be retained for Civil Unions and Domestic
Partnerships).
235
For a list of states that define custody jurisdiction as pertaining to “children of the
marriage,” see Bryce Levine, Note, Divorce and the Modern Family: Providing In Loco
Parentis Stepparents Standing to Sue for Custody of Their Stepchildren in a Dissolution
Proceeding, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 315, 336, n.149 (1996).
236
See Cary v. Buxton, 1793 WL 256, 5 (Va. 1793) (“father[’]s intention to provide
for all the children of the marriage . . . .”); Peyton v. Hallett, 1 Cai. R. 363, n.(a) (interests
of “children of the marriage” not affected.).
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be for children’s sake that we channel adults into the restrictive institution of
marriage.
Critics to the left of the SSM movement have mocked the use of children in
the SSM litigation as a transparent attempt to make same-sex couples look
“normal.”237 This same criticism of marriage dismisses it as inherently boring,
sexually stifling, and autonomy-denying.238 Proponents of SSM may need to
concede that marriage is all those things. But so is parenthood. For those who
question why straight adults burden themselves with the restrictions of marriage,
and why so many gay adults are expending so many resources so that they have the
opportunity to burden themselves with the restrictions of marriage, it helps to
remember children. The limited reliable data that we have on child-rearing
suggests that children probably benefit from their parents’ boredom and lack of
autonomy, from the cabined sexuality, and from the stability and interdependence
that marks marriage.239
Embracing the link between marriage and children is particularly important
for many same-sex families. As discussed in Part III, traditionally, marriage
determined parenthood, especially for fathers.240 Opponents of SSM are wrong
when they suggest that traditional marriage ensures that children are raised by their
biological parents. As Blackstone said, traditional marriage ensures that children
have legal parents.241 Marriage was never able to make the biological link secure.
Instead, the person married to the woman who gave birth was the father.
The marital presumption has waned in importance as genetic science has
made it increasingly easy to determine genetic parenthood. This has led to a wave
of cases involving non-genetic parenthood. A divorcing woman can now reliably
inform her soon-to-be-ex-husband that he is not the genetic father of “their” child,
and then argue that he should be denied custody.242 Divorcing men find out they
237

See Franke, supra note 219, at 239-40 (noting “the deployment of children as
props that attest to our normalcy . . .”).
238
Id. (“It’s a tired argument by now that the problem with these staged spectacles [of
gay couples looking ‘normal’] . . . is that they are boring, though of course they are.”); see
also MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL: SEX, POLITICS, AND THE ETHICS OF
QUEER LIFE, 87-95 (Harvard Univ. Press 1999) (discussing how supporting SSM ignores
the best principles of Stonewall, which included, “diversity in sexual and intimate
relations” and “resistance to state sanctioned legitimacy of consensual sex.”).
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See Gennetian, et al., supra note 70, at 417; Ginther & Pollack, supra note 70, at
691; MCLANANAHAN & SANDEFUR, supra note 70, at 134.
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See Baker, supra note 63, at 22-23 (“For most of western history, marriage, not
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See Blackstone, supra note 62, at 443 (“the main end and design of marriage [is] to
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See, e.g., Matter of Marriage of Sleeper, 929 P.2d 1028, 1030 (Or. Ct. App. 1996)
(mother estopped from denying husband’s paternity); In re Marriage of Roberts, 649
N.E.2d 1344, 1346 (Ill. 1995) (biological mother estopped from denying husband’s
paternity of the child when she represented to him that he was the father and, relying on
that representation, he developed a relationship with the child.).
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are not the genetic fathers and argue that they should not have to pay child
support.243 Divorcing men find out they are not genetic fathers but still want
parental rights.244
These cases have bred new doctrines involving equitable parenthood, de facto
parenthood, and much more expansive visitation options for non-legal parents,245
but defining parenthood through marriage would render many of these doctrines
unnecessary. Gay parents have benefited from these doctrines to a certain extent,
but they would find much more protection in the traditional link between marriage
and parenthood. If marriage defined parenthood, courts would not have to struggle
nearly so much with these equitable and ill-defined doctrines.246 Courts would not
need to look for parenting contracts or implicit intent to share parental rights
between gay partners.247 More important, non-biological gay parents would have
access to what non-biological straight parents have always been awarded—
custody, not just visitation.248 Custodial rights and child support responsibilities
would be part of the rights and obligation of marriage because children are a part
of the definition of marriage.
A strong link between marriage and parenthood could also protect gay parents
from the potential dangers involved in the increasingly strong call to make genetic
parenthood more relevant. The United States is one of the few major industrialized
countries that still allows anonymous gamete donation.249 Canada, the UK, and
Sweden all require that children born through artificial insemination be given
access to information that allows them to find their donor parents.250 This means
243

See, e.g., Markov v. Markov, 758 A.2d 75, 76 (Md. 2000) (husband who found out
he was not the biological father still responsible for child support if biological father cannot
be found); M.H.B. v. H.T.B., 498 A.2d 775, 777 (N.J. 1985) (husband who found out he
was not the father of third child of the marriage still responsible for child support).
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See, e.g., In re Marriage of Gallagher, 539 N.W.2d 479 (Iowa 1995) (husband
could seek custody of child even though he had found out he was not the genetic father);
In re Marriage of Roberts, 694 NE2d at 1346 (same).
245
See Baker, supra note 63, at 31-35 (describing the variety of contexts in which
courts have used equitable parent doctrines to provide visitation rights); AMERICAN LAW
INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.03(b)-(c) (2002) (recommending the adoption of the terms
equitable parent and de facto parent).
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There is often vigorous debate over the applicability of these doctrines. See the
dissents in Markov, 758 A.2d at 84 (citing the dissent in Knill v. Knill, 510 A.2d 546, 552);
MHB, 498 A.2d at 781, and Gallagher, 539 N.W.2d at 483.
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See E.N.O. v. L.M.M. 711 N.E.2d 886, 891-92 (Mass. 1999); see generally J.A.L.
v. E.P.H., 682 A.2d 1314, 1317 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996).
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petition for custody, not just visitation.
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See Katharine K. Baker, Bionormativity and the Construction of Parenthood, 42
GA. L. REV. 649, 688 (2008) (discussing the trend to identify gamete donors as an
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that, in many gay families, there are clearly identifiable alternative parent
figures.251 If a gay couple is divorcing, and perhaps even if they are not, that
alternative parent figure may be able to secure some sort of parental rights.
Allowing a sperm donor or surrogate mother to secure rights dissipates the rights
of the gay parents. A strong link between marriage and parenthood diminishes the
relative importance of genetics to parenthood and strengthens gay parental rights.
3. Summary
Story #7 incorporates many of the previously offered stories of marriage. It
explains why the state confers marital rights and obligations, why marriage has
meaning beyond those rights and obligations, and why children should be relevant
to discussions of marriage. What Story #7 rejects is Story #6. Marriage is not a
forum for gender production. Marriage makes spouses, not husbands and wives.
Becoming a spouse has social meaning that gives marriage its constitutive and
expressive qualities, which, in turn, make marriage a fundamental right. Gay
couples are just as able to become spouses as are straight couples. Gay couples do
not have an equality right to degender the gender factory, but if marriage is not
inherently gendered, then gay couples have an equality right to the institution.
B. Some Implications
Social conservatives often assume that the SSM movement is the inevitable
outgrowth of the loosening of marriage and gender norms that started with the
divorce reform movement in the 1960s.252 Story #7 reflects liberalized gender
norms—it rejects the role of marriage in producing gender at all—but it does not
reflect the ideology of the divorce reform movement of the 1960s and 1970s.
Indeed, as the following discussion suggests, the story of marriage offered here
rejects much of what is considered the modern ideology of marriage.
1. Spousal Maintenance
First, the divorce revolution’s theory of divorce involved both “end[ing], as
far as possible, all personal and economic ties between the spouses” and
emphasizing that “both spouses should become equal and independent social and
economic actors after divorce and that neither spouse should be especially
burdened by the divorce decree.”253 Because, in the 1960s and 1970s, women were
251

Id. at 714 (suggesting that the movement to identify genetic parents may lead to a
more fluid understanding of parenthood, one in which the traditional two-parent model
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coming to be viewed as equally able to earn money, and because personal growth
and individual autonomy came to be valued more highly than they once were,254
the law’s willingness to bind two divorced people together dissipated. “Neither
[spouse] should be shackled by the unnecessary burdens of an unhappy
marriage.”255 The ideal of letting the couple go their separate ways was consistent
with the emerging understanding of marriage as a relationship between
autonomous equals, either of whom could choose to leave if he or she was
unhappy. Virtually every state amended their spousal maintenance statutes to
encourage more limited alimony awards as a way of minimizing long-term
entanglement between ex-spouses.
Few people today quarrel with the idea that marriage is a relationship between
equals, and few more argue for a return to fault-based divorce.256 But, it did not
take long for courts or commentators to realize that divorce reform’s vision of the
parties being able to completely separate after divorce simply would not work. In
marriages of significant duration or with differentiated roles, both members of the
couple usually cease being autonomous. The primary wage earner depends on the
non-wage earner for unpaid, familial labor—most of which usually benefits the
parties’ children—and the primary caretaker depends on the primary wage earner
for financial well-being. Those dependencies cannot be addressed adequately with
a simple edict that directs the parties to go their separate ways.
When men’s marital contributions are primarily monetary and women’s
marital contributions are primarily nonmonetary, ending all personal and economic
ties between the parties leaves ex-wives extraordinarily vulnerable. Even if a wife
does make monetary contributions to the marriage, if they are less than her
husband’s (which, as part IV shows, they usually are), encouraging the two parties
to go their separate ways can leave a woman in economic circumstances far less
desirable than those she enjoyed while married. Some judges realized this after the
initial divorce reforms were adopted. They began rejecting limited-term
maintenance because they recognized the hardship it imposed on women.257 Recent
254

See Carl Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformation of American Family
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See generally Ira Mark Ellman & Sharon Lohr, Marriage as Contract,
Opportunistic Violence, and Other Bad Arguments for Fault Divorce, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV.
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reform work also acknowledges the failure of the divorce revolution in this regard,
making clear that in marriages of sufficient duration or with significant role
division, the clean break theory of divorce should not apply.258
The movement away from a more individualistic view of marriage, and back
toward a recognition that marriage creates lasting interdependencies can be seen by
some as a step in the wrong direction. People eager to see women assume equally
prominent roles in the public sphere resist this step backwards because awarding
maintenance to women who opt out of competition in the public sphere may
encourage them to opt out. People concerned about maximizing women’s presence
in prominent and powerful public positions may think that marriage should not
encourage traditional gender roles in any way.
The story of marriage offered here encourages traditional gender roles
because it acknowledges the efficiency and stability that can stem from marital
roles. It rewards the spouse who assumes the traditionally female role. In doing so,
it gives same-sex couples the right to marry, but at the cost of celebrating the roles
that lead to such a glaring gender wage gap. It accepts marriage as a union of
equals—it understands marital roles as rooted in marriage, not gender—but, it
suggests that one of the main reasons for marriage is to allow for the creation of a
separate but equal regime.
In the long term, SSM may help reduce the correlation between gender roles
and marital roles. If enough same-sex couples assume marital roles that are
inconsistent with their socially defined gender roles, the gender roles themselves
may be destabilized. This is the fear of opponents of SSM.259 If enough men
become primary caretakers and enough women become primary wage earners,
then the likelihood that straight couples will fall into traditional gender roles may
dissipate. Marriage will still facilitate roles, just not sex-based gender roles. This
will take time, however. In the interim, the acceptance of roles is likely to enable
or encourage married women to continue to commit less time to the paid labor
force and more time to unpaid work.
2. Premarital Agreements
Second, the idealization of emotional interdependence in marriage
undermines modern trends to rely more on contract doctrine in marriage.
Acknowledging the emotional interdependence of marriage is critical to explaining
why marriage should be viewed as a fundamental right because it is the emotional
interdependence that gives marriage its expressive and constitutive qualities. But
the emotional connection between the parties undermines the ability of traditional
contract law to order affairs between them. Thus, Story #7 casts doubt on some
courts’ willingness to enforce premarital agreements.
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Many states still require a finding of procedural fairness before enforcing
premarital agreements, but most states have dispensed with any substantive review
of premarital contract terms. 260 As long as there was a full disclosure of assets
prior to execution, and as long as the parties had a chance to secure independent
legal representation, courts will enforce the contracts.261
If part of what we celebrate in marriage is its ability to alter the individuals
who enter the institution, its ability to make two into one, it is not clear that we
should honor a contract made between the two. It is not, as the traditional nonenforcement policy presumed, that such an agreement is made in contemplation of
divorce and therefore against public policy.262 Rather, it is that the self one is
acting on behalf of when one signs a prenuptial agreement is supposed to be
changed by marriage. If one acts to protect the premarital self, one is undermining
the emotional transformation that marriage is supposed to enable and encourage.
The purpose of marriage is to change its participants, to make them less
autonomous, more duty-bound, and more defined by others. A premarital
agreement protecting the premarital self enables one to avoid the emotional and
material work of marriage. If one avoids that work, one should not be entitled to
the respect and dignity that accompanies marriage.
For some this may be too harsh a response to premarital agreements, many of
which are entered into by older couples seeking to protect their offspring’s
inheritance. These seemingly sensible and non-problematic estate planning devices
protect for the decedent’s children the share of her estate that otherwise would go
to her spouse at her death.263 Because the marriages involved in these agreements
often do not last that long, perhaps the emotional transformation that marriage is
supposed to produce need not bar the agreements’ enforcement. Or perhaps courts
should be allowed to enforce the agreements, but review them carefully for
substantive fairness. A very strong endorsement of the argument above suggests
that marital contracts cannot be enforced at all.
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A more moderate (and realistic) endorsement of the argument above suggests
that courts should simply return to a comprehensive substantive review of the
agreements, to ensure that the contract reflects the background norms of marriage,
including sharing and sacrifice. If the state licenses marriage because it wants to
encourage sharing and sacrifice, it is not clear that people who want to avoid
sharing and sacrifice should be able to marry. Some contracting, or baselinesetting, could still be allowed, but the wealthier party would need to be prepared to
show that the agreement was substantively fair.264
3. Less Autonomy
At a more abstract level, the story of marriage offered here simply rejects an
individualistic, more casual approach to marriage. Story #7 sounds more in the
language of Griswold v. Connecticut, marriage is “intimate to the degree of being
sacred . . . an association that promotes a way of life . . . a harmony in living . . . an
association for as noble a purpose as any,”265 than Eisenstadt v. Baird, “the marital
couple is not an independent entity with a mind and heart of its own, but an
association of two individuals each with a separate intellectual and emotional
makeup.”266 Case law subsequent to Eisenstadt suggests that the right protected in
that case, for single people to receive contraceptives, can be found in an
individual’s liberty interest in reproductive decision-making.267 Thus, the marriage
narrative offered here does not reject the holding of Eisenstadt, only its dicta
suggesting that marriage is nothing more than an association of two individuals.268
Nor does Story #7 suggest that we should return to the days of fault-based
divorce because marriages must be permanent and harder to exit. The ideal of
marriage presented here is just that, an ideal. What is celebrated in marriage is the
potential to live into that changed life, to experience the difference of two
becoming one. For sure, many married people will not experience that. They will
divorce too early or they will live a married life marked by much more autonomy
and independence than merger. The state cannot compel the emotional
interdependence that is reified in marriage; it can only endorse and encourage it.
By explicitly encouraging that emotional interdependence, Story #7 goes
further than most other stories of marriage in explaining why polyandrous
arrangements are not entitled to constitutional protection. The state courts granting
same-sex couples the right to marry have been notably weak in their explanation of
264
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why marriage need not be extended to multiple spouse arrangements. The
Massachusetts Court dropped a footnote noting that no party had suggested that the
rules barring polygamy would be implicated if the Court legalized SSM.269
Presumably though, if the Court could find no rational reason for restricting
marriage to a man and a woman despite the numerous studies suggesting that
children tend to do best in a married household with both of their biological
parents,270 it would want some evidence suggesting that the restriction on multiparty marriage was necessary before dismissing a right to polyandrous marriage.
Comparably, in a footnote and without evidence, the California Court
dismissed any potential arguments about polyandry noting the “potentially
detrimental effect on a sound family environment.”271 Why the Court thought that
more than one spouse would have obviously detrimental effects on the family
environment went completely undiscussed. For a Court that so adamantly declared
the constitutionality of the right to marry, the Court’s willingness to summarily
dismiss the right to a different kind of marriage—one that is probably the most
widely practiced form of marriage in the world—is quite remarkable.
The reason why polyandrous relationships should not command the same
constitutional respect is because it is extraordinarily difficult for three or four, or
five or six to become one. Relationships of more than two people are so much less
likely to achieve the kind of transcendence and intimacy that is celebrated in
marriage that the state should not endorse those relationships. It is the emotionally
interdependent connection that creates the separate marital entity as a unity. It is
that unity that serves the interests of both individuals and the state.
There is plenty to criticize in this ideal of marriage. Many people reject it
because they reject the idea of state-sponsored marriage. 272 Many people may
believe that people would be better off if the state chose to treat everyone as an
individual and nothing as a unity. Others probably reject Story #7 as too hopelessly
rooted in a patriarchal past, one in which the “we” really represents nothing other
than the “I” of the husband.273 Still others can dismiss this ideal as fanciful. If so
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many marriages end in divorce, the ideal is so rarely realized, that it is pointless to
reify it.274
All of these criticisms may be valid, but all of them also leave one struggling
to answer why marriage is a fundamental right or why gays and lesbians may have
an equality right to the institution. If marriage does not serve expressive and
constitutive functions, then why aren’t states free to deny it to prisoners275 and to
men too poor to pay child support?276 If there is no legal ideal of marriage, why
can’t four people get married? Alternatively, if the problem with Story #7 is that it
is a fanciful ideal, not a real description of marriage, then supporters of SSM are
left to argue that what they are fighting for is real marriage. But real marriage, as
Part IV shows, is a gender factory. It is an institution that promotes stability and
interdependence and self-fulfillment by enabling and reproducing gender roles. If
that is what SSM advocates are fighting for, they cannot have an equality right to it
because they are not similarly situated with regard to the ability to reify those
gender roles.
CONCLUSION
The stories of marriage offered in this article do not constitute an exhaustive
list. State-sponsored marriage may mean many other things to other people. But
words and social institutions do have common meanings informed by common
norms. Nobody thinks I have a right to marry my pet. Everybody understands what
it means when a prisoner claims a right to get married. There is commonality in the
midst of all the debate over SSM.
The stories that get told about marriage affect that common understanding of
marriage as do the practices of people who marry. At present, the practices of
married people strongly support the gendered story of marriage. This story posits
that what makes marriage so beneficial to its participants and to society is its
ability to promote and reproduce gender. This story of marriage proves resilient in
the face of both fundamental right and equality challenges because it suggests that
same-sex couples are unlikely to achieve or enjoy the marital benefits that come
from conforming to gender roles, and they are not similarly situated to straight
couples with regard to their ability to reify those gender roles. Proponents of SSM
need another story to tell about marriage.
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Fundamental rights arguments require an articulation of why marriage is more
than a bundle of legal rights and obligations, and how it can be that something
more without incorporating gender norms. Equality arguments require an
explanation of why same-sex couples should be entitled to marriage, not just civil
unions. The seemingly cogent maxim offered by courts and commentators, that
separate is not equal, reflects neither real world sensibilities with regard to gender
nor the totality of the law of gender discrimination. Private biases with regard to
gender roles play an important part in courts’ acceptance of gender difference and,
in many contexts, courts accept separately gendered regimes.
To make those private biases less salient in the context of marriage, SSM
proponents must start telling a story of marriage as an institution that is ennobling
and restricting, demanding and edifying, without being gendered. It must be a story
that explains why the state should encourage both the emotional and material
interdependence of marriage. The story offered here is one such story. It is a story
that may make marriage unattractive to many, but a right for same-sex couples.

